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Abstract
Agents at the beginning of a dynamic coordination process (1) are uncer-
tain about actions of their fellow players and (2) anticipate receiving strategi-
cally relevant information later on in the process. In such environments, the
(ir)reversibility of early actions plays an important role in the choice among
them. We characterize the strategic effects of the reversibility option on the
coordination outcome. Such an option can either enhance or hamper efficient
coordination, and we determine the direction of the effect based only on simple
features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on a generaliza-
tion of the Laplacian property known from static global games: players at the
beginning of a dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed about
aggregate play of fellow players in each stage of the coordination process.
JEL classification: C7, D8.
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1 Introduction
An agent at the outset of an economic crisis is uncertain about the future evolution
of the economy because she does not know how fellow agents perceive the odds of
the crisis and, hence, how they will act. Additionally, such an agent anticipates to
receive strategically valuable information in later stages of economic development
and therefore the decisions at the outset of the crisis, as well as indirectly the final
outcome of the crisis, may crucially depend on the reversibility of the early actions.
Reversibility of early decision is always beneficial in single person decision prob-
lems because later on, in a light of subsequent information, the decision may be viewed
as detrimental. The effects of reversibility become more complex in strategic prob-
lems. While each agent would benefit from a unilateral provision of the reversibility
option as it alleviates the adverse effects of uncertainty, the provision of the option to
all agents can be harmful because the very source of the uncertainty — the actions
of fellow players — becomes less predictable. In the case of coordination problems
studied here, the reversibility option helps agents avoid participation in a coordina-
tion failure, but at the same time it may also increase the incidence of coordination
failures. Thus, while the provision of the option to reverse an action unambiguously
increases the incentive to take the action in non-strategic problems, the sign of the
effect cannot be determined without careful analysis in strategic problems.
The starting point of our analysis — the observation that agents at the outset of
crisis are uncertain about others’ actions — is well formalized in the global games liter-
ature. A global game is an incomplete information coordination game that captures
crises as coordination failures. Players receive private signals about an underlying
economic fundamental and in the unique equilibrium, they invest at signals above a
certain threshold signal and do not invest below that threshold. The critical agent at
the outset of the crisis corresponds to the player receiving the threshold signal consti-
tuting the boundary between the sets of investing and non-investing types and who
is uncertain about the realized proportions of the fellow players on each side of the
boundary and so is uncertain about the aggregate investment. A key to the solution
of static global games is an observation that the threshold type has uniform belief
about the aggregate investment. To emphasize the connection to Laplace’s principle
of insufficient reason, Morris and Shin (2003) dub such belief as Laplacian, and we
will refer to this observation as the Laplacian property. The main methodological
contribution of this paper is a generalization of the Laplacian property to dynamic
environments. The property will, in the generalized form, play a key role in our
analysis of dynamic coordination problem with a reversible action.
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The Laplacian property not only greatly enhances tractability of the static global
games, but at the same time it captures the intuition of the strategic uncertainty
during crises. Because of this attractiveness, the static global game framework is
often applied even at a cost of abstracting from dynamic features of the analyzed
problem. For example, Morris and Shin (2004) study debt crises as coordination
failures arising among a group of creditors. Their model focuses on the interim
stage of an investment project, after the creditors have invested in the project but
before its completion. Each creditor has the option to exit the project in the interim
stage, and the project fails if a critical mass of the creditors do exit. To fit the
static global game framework, Morris and Shin (2004) keep entry decisions at the
beginning of the project exogenous. The unique equilibrium of such a static game
exhibits inefficient exit behavior, and thus it is natural to ask how the provision of
the exit option influences players’ ability to coordinate on efficient investment. The
purpose of our paper is to provide a framework that addresses this very question.
Such a question requires a dynamic model because variation in the provision of the
exit option will affect the entry decisions. The total effect of the provision of the exit
option is, without a formal analysis, ambiguous because the option will be beneficial
if the project turns out to evolve towards a failure, but occurrence of the coordination
failures may increase with the provision of the option.
In the previous paragraph the risky investment was reversible while the safe action
was kept irreversible — the investment could not be delayed. A related question can
be asked about coordination problems in which investing, or risky action in general,
is irreversible but can be delayed in order to acquire additional information. As in the
previous case, the effect of such delay option on the final coordination outcome can
be determined only by a formal analysis. On one hand, the delay option is helpful
because promising projects will attract large participation in at least in a late stage of
the coordination process but, on the other hand, if too many players delay investment,
projects that would have succeeded in the absence of the delay option may become
unpromising.
We capture such dynamic problems by a coordination game in which players decide
whether to participate in a project consisting of an early and a late stage. Players first
decide on their participation at the beginning of the first stage based on their initial
private information. During the first stage of the project players learn additional
private information and can reverse the initial decision in between the two stages.
More precisely, one of the two available actions, participation or non-participation, is
irreversible and the other is reversible, which induces an option value to the reversible
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action.
When evaluating the reversible action at the beginning of the game, each player
has to form an expectation about the profits from the early and the late stage of
the project. The latter expectation is more complex and so we focus on it in the
introduction. When forming the expectation at the beginning of the game about
the late stage profit, the player holding the reversibility option has to condition on
her participating in the late stage. A direct characterization of this expectation is
cumbersome because it involves computation of equilibrium belief about the fellow
players’ actions, and the belief has to be conditioned on the use of the option. Our
main technical insight is that the characterization of this complicated belief can be
circumvented by the use of the Laplacian property generalized to dynamic games. We
find that the threshold type at the beginning of the game forms her expectation about
the profit from the second stage of the project in a particularly simple way. Taking
into account the reversibility option, she forms the expectation as if she had uniform
belief about the participation level in the second stage of the project and as if she did
not have the option.
Unlike in the static global game in which the threshold type truly has uniform
belief, the Laplacian property in the dynamic game is a virtual “as if” property; the
actual belief is not uniform, and players do have the option. This virtual character-
ization reflects our analytical approach. To avoid the direct characterization of the
option value in the dynamic environment, we map a part of the dynamic game to a
virtual static game with a mapping that does not distort the payoff expectation of
the threshold type. We can then solve the virtual static game using existing static
global game tools.
Our benchmark, to which we will compare the coordination outcome in the dy-
namic game, is a static game without the reversibility option in which the decisions
at the beginning of the project are irreversible. Thanks to the generalized Lapla-
cian property, the characterization of the reversibility effects becomes simple. As the
Laplacian property holds in both games, we do not need to worry about the differences
in the equilibrium beliefs across the two games and we can evaluate the differences in
the expected payoffs of the threshold types and, hence, in equilibrium actions, based
solely on certain simple mechanistic properties of the investment project.
We find that the provision of either the exit or the delay option can enhance or
hamper efficient coordination and that the sign of the effect depends on an intertem-
poral payoff structure. We say that payoffs exhibit forward spillovers if production
has inertia, so that profit in the late stage depends not only on the late but also on the
3
payoff spillovers option to
backward forward exit delay
X × more failures less failures
× X less failures more failures
× × irrelevance result
Table 1: Effect of the reversibility option on the occurrence of coordination failures.
early investment level. We say that payoffs exhibit backward spillovers if the profit
from participation in the early stage of the project depends not only on the early but
also on the late investment level.1 Using this terminology, the effects are the follow-
ing: the exit option enhances efficient coordination in projects with forward spillovers
and hampers efficient coordination in projects with backward spillovers. The delay
option has the opposite effects. As a corollary, neither the exit nor the delay option
has any effect in projects without both backward and forward spillovers.
We keep the structure of the paper and the exposition of the generalized Laplacian
property subordinated to the economic problem of reversible investment. However,
the Laplacian property holds beyond our baseline setup. In Section 8, we sketch the
extensions of the Laplacian property to dynamic environments with a more general
option structure. We let players interact in a dynamic game with multiple rounds in
which player’s action choice in each round imposes constraints on the future play.
We share the focus on the effects of reversibility options on investment decisions
with McDonald and Siegel (1986) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994), but we differ in the
source of uncertainty and in the benchmark. Their literature on single-person in-
vestment decisions with delay option considers uncertainty coming from exogenous
shocks, and their benchmark is the neoclassical setup with all actions reversible. In
our framework, the main source of uncertainty is endogenous and strategic as the
players are uncertain about others’ actions and our benchmark is the static global
game. The difference in the source of the uncertainty dictates differences in research
questions and methods. Our main result characterizes the direction of the reversibil-
ity effect on the incentive to invest in the strategic environment. In the non-strategic
environment, reversibility unambiguously increases the incentive to choose the re-
versible action, and hence such models can focus on the size of the effects. Regarding
the method, the core of our analysis consists of the characterization of beliefs about
the uncertain behavior of the fellow player, whereas the beliefs about the source of
uncertainty are exogenous in the other literature.
1Backward spillovers can arise if players cannot exit the project to the full extent or under schemes
which redistribute profits among the investors.
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Our paper belongs to a booming literature on dynamic global games. One of
the strands of this literature emphasizes intertemporal tradeoffs of players facing
frictions in the adjustment of actions to an evolving environment (Burdzy, Frankel
and Pauzner 2001, or Levin 2001). The second stream of this literature emphasizes
equilibrium multiplicity induced by public learning stemming from observation of en-
dogenously chosen public policy (Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2006), observation of
prices (Angeletos and Werning 2006), or observation of earlier coordination outcomes
(Angeletos, Hellwig, and Pavan 2007).
Our paper belongs to yet another stream of the dynamic global games literature
in which one of the available actions is irreversible while another can be reverted fric-
tionlessly which, together with learning, induces positive option value to the reversible
action. Heidhues and Melissas (2006), Dasgupta (2007) and Dasgupta, Steiner, and
Stewart (2007) allow players to delay their investment decisions in order to engage
in learning. Learning is private, and hence, unlike in the second stream of the litera-
ture, equilibrium uniqueness may be preserved, which facilitates the characterization
of the reversibility effects. The generalized Laplacian property described here unifies
the characterization of the reversibility effects across a large class of setups without
resorting to specific payoff functions.
One of the dynamic effects studied in the literature but not here is that investment
by one player can trigger investment by her fellow players either through signalling or
even absent of signalling via complementarities; see Corsetti, et al. (2004) or Ho¨rner
(2004) within the global games, and Chamley and Gale (1994), Gale (1995), or Gul
and Lundholm (1995) outside of the global games literature. Our model abstracts
from informational externalities because the amount of information revealed during
coordination is assumed to be independent of players’ actions. Moreover, our players
are small and therefore cannot individually trigger investments by others.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; Sec-
tion 3 provides an informal overview of the analysis; Section 4 contains the main
technical contribution of the paper — it describes the generalized Laplacian property
in dynamic games. The Laplacian property holds in monotone strategy profiles, and
hence in Section 5 we constrain our attention to global games in which the mono-
tone strategy profiles are relevant for the equilibrium analysis. Section 6 identifies
the strategic effects of the reversibility option by comparing equilibria across the dy-
namic game and the static benchmark, and Section 7 continues in this comparison in
the limit of small noise. In Section 8 we further explore generality of the Laplacian
property in a large set of dynamic coordination games.
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2 Model
We study a dynamic, binary action game, Γdyn, with one of the two actions being
reversible and the other irreversible. A continuum of players indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]
simultaneously choose action ai1 ∈ {0, 1} in round 1. Players who played action
0 reach their final node and receive a payoff normalized to 0. Players who played
action 1 choose simultaneously ai2 ∈ {0, 1} in round 2. The payoff for private action
history 2 ai1a
i
2 = 10 is u1(θ, l1, l2), and the payoff for private action history 11 is
u1(θ, l1, l2) + u2(θ, l1, l2). The letter θ denotes a payoff parameter which we refer to
as the fundamental, l1 denotes the measure of players playing a
i
1 = 1 in round 1,
and l2 is the measure of players choosing 1 in both rounds. Functions u1 and u2 are
real-valued, defined on the domain {(θ, l1, l2) ∈ R× [0, 1]× [0, 1] : l2 ≤ l1}. We assume
that ut are continuous in all arguments.
3 The additive payoff structure is without
loss of generality and facilitates the formulation of assumptions that we impose on
the model below.
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Figure 1: Decision tree in the dynamic game Γdyn (left) and in the benchmark static
game Γst (right). Moves of Nature and of fellow players are not depicted.
This game can be interpreted as a process of investment in a project with two
production stages. Round 1 takes place at the beginning of stage 1, and interpreting
action 1 as investing, players decide whether to invest or take an outside option.
Round 2 takes place in between production stages 1 and 2. In round 2, we interpret
action 1 as staying in and 0 as exiting the project. Payoff ut is interpreted as a profit
from participating in the stage t = 1, 2 of the project, and lt are the investment
(participation) levels in stage t.
2For simplicity of notation we abbreviate the ordered pair (ai1, a
i
2) to a
i
1a
i
2.
3Results can be extended to allow for isolated payoffs discontinuities such as those used in the
games of regime change.
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Following the global games literature, we assume heterogeneity in players’ private
information. Nature draws the (common) fundamental θ from improper4 uniform
distribution on R. At the beginning of round t = 1, 2 player i moving in round t
observes a private signal xit = θ + ση
i
t. The vector of errors (η
i
1, η
i
2) is distributed
according to a continuous joint distribution with a compact convex support H, joint
density f , and joint c.d.f. F . We assume that (ηi1, η
i
2) are i.i.d. across players and
independent from θ (but are not required to be independent across rounds). The
supports of the marginal distributions of ηit are assumed to be symmetric intervals
[−ht, ht] where h1 and h2 are strictly positive constants. The symmetry is without loss
of generality because if the supports of the marginal distributions were not symmetric
around 0, players would simply subtract the bias of errors from their signals when
forming posterior beliefs. Marginal c.d.f. of ηi1 and η
i
2 are denoted by F1 and F2. In
addition, we denote ηi∆ = η
i
2 − ηi1 the difference of the errors. The support of ηi∆ is
[η
∆
, η∆] where η∆ = min(η1,η2)∈H(η2− η1) and η∆ = max(η1,η2)∈H(η2− η1). We denote
the marginal c.d.f. of ηi∆ by F∆. We assume no aggregate uncertainty about the
realization of the errors — the realized population of errors is identical to the joint
density f .
x1
x2
X
x2 − x1 = ση∆
x2 − x1 = ση∆
0
Figure 2: Type space X and related notation.
Bold letter xi = (xi1, x
i
2) denotes the type (signal pair) of player i. The type
set is X =
{
(x1, x2) : x2 − x1 ∈ [ση∆, ση∆]
}
; see Figure 2. We will use the usual
incomplete product order ≤ to compare the types. A pure strategy is a pair of
functions s = (s1, s2) with st : X → {0, 1} and with s1(xi1, xi2) depending only on the
4The use of the improper distribution does not cause any ambiguities, because we work only with
probabilities conditional on the signals, and these are well defined. See Morris and Shin (2003) for
the discussion of the use of uninformative prior in global games.
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first signal xi1. Notice that the values of s2(x) for types x at which s1(x) = 0 are
payoff irrelevant because such types do not reach round 2. Abusing terminology and
notation, we will also call signal xi1 in round 1 a type, and action rule s1(x
i
1) in round
1 a strategy.
Our main applied result characterizes the effect of provision of the reversibility
option on the coordination outcome. To that end we compare the above dynamic
game Γdyn with a benchmark static game Γst which differs from Γdyn only in the lack
of the reversibility option: each player can move only in round 1; once a player invests
in round 1, she must automatically stay in the project in round 2; see Figure 1 for
the comparison of the games. To facilitate comparison with the dynamic game, we
keep the lower index 1 when describing the signal xi1 or strategy s1(x
i
1) in the static
game despite it having only one non-trivial round.
2.1 Discussion of the setup
Let us briefly discuss the assumptions imposed on the model up to now. First,
the uninformative prior together with the independence of errors with respect to θ
imply that conditional distributions are invariant to diagonal translations on the type
space, i.e., (θ,xj)| (xi + t · (1, 1)) = t ·(1, 1, 1)+(θ,xj)|xi. This translation invariance,
which is necessary for the generalized Laplacian property, would be distorted by an
informative prior. However, in the limit of small noise, as σ → 0+, any prior becomes
approximately uninformative, and hence our results remain to be approximately valid
under any prior, as long as the signals are sufficiently precise. This fact is also
important for the interpretation of our comparative results that specify whether the
provision of the reversibility option enlarges the set of investing types. Formally
we cannot draw implication on the ex ante welfare because of the improper prior,
but our results on the changes in equilibrium thresholds have unambiguous welfare
consequences under any proper prior.
Second, we assume that the value of the fundamental θ is fixed throughout the
game. The generalized Laplacian property would remain valid in a randomly evolving
environment. We abstract from the fluctuations in θ because learning alone suffices
to induce positive value to the reversibility option, and the arguments behind the
generalized Laplacian property are orthogonal to the fluctuations.
Third, we assumed that investment — the risky action — is reversible and the
safe action is irreversible. This choice is arbitrary, and we will also consider a simple
variant of the above dynamic game in which we switch the reversibility of the actions.
In this variant, we will keep the investment irreversible, whereas not investing will
8
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Figure 3: Variant of the dynamic game in which players can delay investment.
be reversible — players may delay investment; see Figure 3. The two variants of the
dynamic game can be mapped to each other by a careful relabeling of the actions so
we will formulate the whole analysis only in terms of the first variant. However, the
studied effects turn out to have opposite signs across the two variants of the dynamic
game, and hence we will sketch the results also for the second variant.
Fourth, let us look at the assumed information structure in round 2 and its connec-
tion to social learning. We specified above that players in round 2 receive additional
information about θ, whereas the early investment level l1 is unobserved. Obviously,
the signal xi2 provides in equilibrium indirect information about l1 as well. For in-
stance, if all players use a monotone strategy with threshold x∗1 in round 1, then θ and
l1 are related by the mapping l1 = 1−F1
(
x∗1−θ
σ
)
. In fact, we can reverse the perspec-
tive and formulate an alternative model in which the primary source of information in
round 2 is a noisy observation of l1 and players learn about θ only indirectly. Assume
in this alternative model that players in round 1 observe fundamental-based signal
xi1 = θ+ση
i
1 as above, but instead of the round 2 signal x
i
2 = θ+ση
i
2, players observe
a noisy aggregate statistic of the round 1 actions. The following specification is used
for the tractability reasons in the literature:5
yi = 1− F−11 (1− l1) + ηi2. (1)
The advantage of this particular specification is that, in a symmetric monotone
equilibrium, the observation of yi turns out to be equivalent to the observation of
xi2 = θ+ση
i
2, as a player observing y
i can compute xi2 in the equilibrium. Hence, the set
of symmetric monotone equilibria must coincide across our model with fundamental-
5This specification has been first used in Dasgupta (2007), and later in Angeletos, Hellwig and
Pavan (2007), Angeletos and Werning (2006) or in Goldstein, Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008).
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based learning and the alternative model with social-based learning. Our model with
fundamental-based learning turns out to have unique equilibrium (under assumptions
from Section 5) which is monotone and symmetric, and so it remains to be unique
equilibrium within the class of monotone symmetric equilibria in the model with social
learning; though non-monotone equilibria cannot be precluded in the latter model.
Last, the learning in our model is assumed to be private which preserves the equi-
librium uniqueness. Private as opposed to public learning is a reasonable assumption
whenever information sources or evem perceptions of a common information source
are heterogenous across the players.
3 Overview of the Argument
Our central goal is to compare investment behavior across the static and the dynamic
game. Both games turn out to have unique rationalizable strategies under global
game assumptions presented in Section 5, and hence we can focus on the comparison
of conditions for the rationalizability of actions across the two games.
Let us first review the arguments in Morris and Shin (2003). They construct
the rationalizability conditions in the static global game in three steps: In the first
step they show that under any symmetric monotone strategy profile with threshold
x∗1, the threshold type x
∗
1 has Laplacian belief about the investment level; l1|x∗1 is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The second step characterizes the rationalizability of
each of the actions. For each x1 ∈ R, let mst(x1) be the expected incentive to invest
of the threshold type x1 under the symmetric monotone profile in which all players
use strategy with the threshold x∗1 = x1. Then action 1/0 is the unique rationalizable
action at signal x1 in the game Γst if and only if mst(x1) is positive/negative. Thanks
to the Laplacian property, the payoff expectation mst(x1) is a simple object — type
x1 has uniform belief about l1 under the profile in which she has the position of the
threshold type. The third step examines the limit of small noise in which players
are almost certain about θ, but the threshold type remains to be entirely uncertain
about l1. In such a limit, all analytical complications coming from the underlying un-
certainty about θ disappear, and the analysis can conveniently focus on the strategic
uncertainty about l1.
Our analysis of the dynamic game follows the above structure with the three steps
as well. The value added lies primarily in our first step in which we show that the
Laplacian property generalizes to the dynamic game. We examine the expectation
of a threshold type x∗1 in round 1 under a monotone strategy s = (s1, s2) where
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s1 has the threshold x
∗
1, and s2 is a symmetric monotone equilibrium strategy in the
continuation game of round 2 induced by s1. That is, we are forcing players to use the
threshold x∗1 in round 1, but assume equilibrium behavior afterwards. We introduce
function mdyn(x
∗
1) = D1(x
∗
1) + D2(x
∗
1) that again denotes the incentive to invest in
round 1 as expected at the threshold signal x∗1 in round 1. It is a sum of the expected
profits
D1 = E[u1|x∗1], D2 = E
[
s2
(
xi
) · E [u2|xi] | x∗1]
for each of the two stages of the project, where in the case of D2 the threshold type
x∗1 anticipates her own action s2 (x
i) ∈ {0, 1} optimally chosen in round 2 based on
information xi = (x∗1, x
i
2).
We analyze the expectations D1 and D2 in Section 4. Expressing D1 is simple
because, exactly as in the static game, the threshold type x∗1 has uniform belief about
the first stage investment level l1. The analysis of the expected second-stage payoff
D2 formed in round 1 is more complex. The threshold type x
∗
1 in round 1 has to
anticipate whether she stays in the project in round 2, and that is contingent on her
signal xi2 that she has yet to receive. Our central finding is that the threshold type x
∗
1
in round 1, taking into account her reversibility option in round 2, forms expectation
D2 as if she had not had the reversibility option and believed that l2 was uniform on
[0, 1]:
D2 =
∫ 1
0
u2(θ, l1, l2)dl2,
where θ and l1 are treated as functions of l2 uniquely induced by the strategy profile s
and by the error distributions. The intuition behind this result is more complex than
the intuition behind the Laplacian property in the static setup. We first show that we
can replace the reversibility option advantage that players enjoy by an informational
advantage. That is, we deprive the players of the exit option, but we compensate
them by manipulating their information at the beginning of the game in a way that
preserves incentives of the threshold type x∗1. This transforms the originally dynamic
problem to a static one, in which the static Laplacian property applies.
In the second step, in Section 5, we examine the rationalizability of actions in
round 1 of the dynamic game. Again, action 1/0 is the unique rationalizable action
at signal x1 in round 1 of Γdyn if and only if mdyn(x1) is positive/negative. Note that
neither mdyn(x1) nor mst(x1) are the equilibrium payoff expectations of type x1 in the
dynamic or the static game. Rather they are expectations in the imaginary situation
in which all the players are forced to use the monotone strategy with the threshold
x1 in round 1.
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As in the static case, the Laplacian property and the rationalizability condition
fruitfully enrich each other in the dynamic game because both D1(x1) and D2(x1)
are formed based on the uniform belief about l1 and l2 respectively and without the
intricacies of the reversibility option. This is applied in Section 6 where we compare
the investment behavior across the two games. It specifies simple and economically
intuitive conditions under which the provision of the option enhances or hampers in-
vestment at the beginning of the project. The comparison is possible because, thanks
to the Laplacian property, the functions mst(x1) and mdyn(x1) are, roughly speaking,
based on identical beliefs about lt across the two games. Under the identical beliefs,
the threshold expectations can be compared across the two games based solely on
qualitative characteristics of the project, without undergoing the equilibrium anal-
ysis of the continuation game in round 2. This is not only convenient, but it also
implies that the comparison does not depend on details of the payoff functions.
In the third step, in Section 7, we continue with the analysis in the limit of precise
signals. As in the static case, the analysis is simplified because players are almost
certain about θ and so the analysis can focus on the strategic uncertainty about l1
and l2. This strategic uncertainty is preserved in the limit and so the reversibility
effects do not vanish even if the noise becomes negligible. Additionally, in the limit
of precise signals, it is possible to delineate rationalizable behavior in round 2 of the
dynamic game. Under a simple condition, the investments from round 1 are not
reverted in round 2. In such cases the provision of the reversibility option affects the
final coordination outcome for a large set of realized fundamental θ, but the option
is not exercised apart from in cases when Nature draws θ from a small neighborhood
of the equilibrium threshold in round 1, and this neighborhood vanishes in the limit
of precise signals.
4 The Laplacian Property
In this section, we analyze payoff expectations of a threshold type in round 1 under a
symmetric monotone strategy profile. First, in Subsection 4.1, we review the Lapla-
cian property in the static games as described in Morris and Shin (2003). Then, in
Subsection 4.2, we describe how the Laplacian property generalizes to the dynamic
game with reversible investment. The class of setups in which the Laplacian prop-
erty holds is larger than the particular economic environment discussed here. In an
extension introduced in Section 8 we further generalize the Laplacian property to dy-
namic environments in which players undergo a series of binary investment decisions,
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with each decision influencing the degree of player’s commitment to the investment
project.
The analysis will pay close attention to monotone strategies s(x) weakly increasing
in x. To avoid ambiguity of the exposition, we assume throughout the paper that
the types on the boundary of set {x ∈ X : st(x) = 1}, t = 1, 2, always invest. This
only facilitates discussion, as manipulation of actions of the boundary types does not
change the best response correspondence of any type.
4.1 Laplacian Belief in the Static Game
Let s1(x
i
1) be a symmetric monotone strategy profile with threshold x
∗
1. The profile
induces a non-decreasing function
`1(θ) = Pr
(
xi1 ≥ x∗1 | θ
)
(2)
that specifies the investment level after round 1 as a function of realized θ.
The following theorem describes the Laplacian property in the static game Γst:
Theorem 1. (Morris and Shin, 2003) The conditional belief `1(θ) | x∗1 is uniform on
[0, 1].
The Laplacian property is driven by the following intuition. The threshold type
x∗1 constitutes a boundary between the sets of investing and non-investing types, and
the type x∗1 is uncertain about the realized proportions of players on the each side
of the boundary. These proportions are determined by the rank of the threshold
type’s signal within the realized population of player signals. The only information
the threshold type receives is her own private signal, which is entirely uninformative
about her rank and consequently about l1. For future exposition, we emphasize that
the Laplacian property holds for any noise distribution, as long as the the prior is
uninformative and the errors are independent across players and of θ.
4.2 Laplacian Expectations in the Dynamic Game
We now examine the expected payoff of the threshold type in round 1 of the dynamic
game Γdyn.
Let us first introduce necessary notation. We fix a symmetric monotone strategy
profile s, and denote the threshold signal in round 1 again by x∗1. We let It = {x ∈ X :
st(x) = 1} denote the set of types that choose action 1 in round t. Sets L1 = I1 and
L2 = I1 ∩ I2 denote the sets of types that participate in the first and in both stages,
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respectively. The strategy s induces a pair of investment profiles `t(θ) = Pr(Lt|θ) that
specify investment levels in round t = 1, 2 for a realized fundamental θ. Note that the
definition of `1(·) is identical to the definition in (2) in the static game because L1 is
the set of types with the first signal of at least x∗1. Both `1 and `2 are non-decreasing
in θ because strategy s is monotone, errors are independent of θ, and the prior is
uninformative. We define ϑt(lt) on domain (0, 1) as inverse functions to `t(θ). We
will also need to express l1 as a function of l2 and vice versa, for which we introduce
λ1(l2) = `1(ϑ2(l2)), and similarly λ2(l1) = `2(ϑ1(l1)). To summarize, out of the
triple of variables θ, l1, l2 we can choose any one as the independent one and express
the remaining two variables as its non-decreasing functions. We introduce u˜t(lt) that
denotes the profit for stage t of the project when all the arguments of ut are expressed
as functions of lt induced by the fixed strategy profile s; u˜1(l1) = u1 (ϑ1(l1), l1, λ2(l1))
and u˜2(l2) = u2 (ϑ2(l2), λ1(l2), l2). Finally, let U2(x) be the conditional expectation of
type x in round 2 about the second stage profit under the strategy s:
U2(x) = E [u2(θ, l1, l2)|x] .
We now examine monotone symmetric strategy profiles under which (I) players
behave optimally in round 2 but not necessarily in round 1, and (II) sufficiently high
types invest in both rounds:
(I) optimality in round 2: For all x ∈ X such that s1(x) = 1: s2(x) = 1 if
U2(x) > 0 and s2(x) = 0 if U2(x) < 0.
(II) non-emptiness in round 2: There exists x ∈ X such that s1(x) = s2(x) = 1.
At this point we impose those assumptions directly on the strategy profile, and below,
in Section 5, we specify assumptions on the primitives of the model that assure that
the assumptions will be satisfied in the profiles relevant for the equilibrium analysis.
We let Dt denote the expected profit for stage t = 1, 2 of the project as expected
in round 1 by the threshold type x∗1. The boundary
6 ∂L1 of the set L1 is the set of
types (x∗1, x
i
2) with the first signal equal to the threshold in round 1. Using this, we
write D1 and D2 as:
D1 = E [u1(θ, l1, l2)|∂L1] , (3)
D2 = E
[
s2(x
i) · U2(xi)|∂L1
]
, (4)
6When we refer to boundary ∂L of a set L ⊆ X we mean the boundary with respect to the
topological space X. That is, ∂L does not include parts of ∂X with respect to the topological space
R2.
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where in the case of D2, a player in round 1 anticipates her own behavior s2(x
i) =
s2(x
∗
1, x
i
2) ∈ {0, 1} which is contingent on the yet unreceived signal xi2. The expecta-
tions are computed under the fixed profile s which we omit from the notation.
The following theorem is the central technical insight of the paper:
Theorem 2 (Generalized Laplacian Property). If a monotone strategy s satisfies
(I)–(II) then the payoff Dt for the stage t = 1, 2 expected by the threshold type x
∗
1 in
round 1 satisfies
Dt =
∫ 1
0
u˜t(lt)dlt. (5)
Proof. Follows from auxiliary Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Equation (5) for the first stage payoff D1 is an immediate consequence of the static
Laplacian property from Theorem 1 because the threshold type x∗1 in round 1 of Γdyn
has uniform belief about l1, exactly as she had in the static case. However, the result
for D2 is not immediate because the relevant belief about l2 is not uniform. Before
proceeding to the proof of Theorem 2, it is instructive to attempt to solve for D2
directly. We can write D2 =
∫ 1
0
u˜2(l2)dP (l2) where for any z ∈ [0, 1]
P (z) = Pr(`2(θ) < z | L2 ∩ ∂L1) · Pr(L2 | ∂L1).
In words, the player with the threshold signal x∗1 in round 1 first computes the prob-
ability that she stays in the project upon receiving xi2 and then she forms belief
about l2 conditioning on staying. Generically, P (·) is not the c.d.f. of the uniform
distribution. The direct characterization of D2 via the function P (·) is cumbersome
because P (·) is a complicated object reflecting both the distributional assumptions
on the errors and the relative positions of the sets Lt. The advantage of Theorem 2
is that it circumvents the computation of the function P (·). The simple integral in
(5) based on the uniform distribution of l2 instead of on P (·) gives the correct value
of D2. The error distributions and the relative positions of L1, L2 still influence D2
but they are summarized by the function λ1(l2) that relates investment levels across
rounds 1 and 2. This separation of the error and profile properties from the beliefs is
convenient because below we will be able to make predictions independent of details
of the functions λt(·).
We deal with the complications stemming from the provision of the reversibility
option in two auxiliary lemmas. In Lemma 1 we transfer the players’ advantage
arising from the option into an advantage arising from a superior information. The
transformed problem is static, and, broadly speaking, this transformation is useful
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Figure 4: Illustration of the argument supporting Lemma 1.
because the variations in information structure do not distort the static Laplacian
property. Indeed, in Lemma 2 we recognize that the transformed problem is essentially
a static one in which the known static Laplacian property holds.
The first auxiliary lemma states that D2 defined by the left-hand side of (6)
satisfies a formula analogous to the definition of D1:
Lemma 1. If a monotone strategy s satisfies conditions (I)–(II), then
E
[
s2(x
i) · U2
(
xi
) |∂L1] = E [u2 (θ, l1, l2) |∂L2] . (6)
The player described by the left-hand side of (6) enjoys the advantage of the exit
option. The right-hand side describes a player who enjoys, compared to the left-hand
side, an advantage of superior information because the boundary ∂L2 lies above ∂L1.
Lemma 1 claims that the information advantage precisely compensates for the loss of
the option advantage.
The idea behind Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 4. Types that observed the
threshold signal x∗1 in round 1 do or do not participate in the second stage of the
project depending on whether their signal xi2 in round 2 exceeds a critical signal x
∗
2.
The participating types (if any) — those on the part of ∂L1 above x
∗
2 — belong
also to the boundary ∂L2. The types who exit — those on the part of ∂L1 below
x∗2 — receive payoff 0 for the second stage. Types x on ∂L2 to the right of x
∗
2 who
participate in stage 2 also receive expected payoff U2(x) = 0 because they must satisfy
the indifference condition in round 2. We show that, when computing the expectation
on the left-hand side of (6), we can replace the exiting types (if any) at ∂L1 below x
∗
2
with the participating types on ∂L2 to the right of x
∗
2. Thus, we have arrived at the
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expectation conditional on ∂L2 of a player who does not exit in round 2 for any type
x ∈ L2 — the right-hand side of (6).
Notice that Lemma 1 and the Laplacian property hold, trivially, even if the player
who observed x∗1 always exits in round 2. Then, the continuation payoff is D2 = 0
which is equal to the right-hand side of (6) because then the whole ∂L2 satisfies the
indifference condition.
Proof of Lemma 1. For convenience, we let σ = 1 in the proof.
Let x∗2 = inf{x2 ∈ [x∗1 + η∆, x∗1 + η∆] : s2(x∗1, x2) = 1} with a convention that
x∗2 = x
∗
1 + η∆ if no type in ∂L1 invests in round 2. We denote η
∗
∆ = x
∗
2 − x∗1.
We prove (6) by showing that both its left- and right-hand side are equal to∫ η∗∆
η
∆
0 dF∆(η∆) +
∫ η∆
η∗∆
U2(x
∗
1, x
∗
1 + η∆) dF∆(η∆). (7)
In the proof we make use of the fact that ηi∆ is independent of events ∂L1 and
∂L2, and therefore the conditional distribution of η
i
∆|∂Lt is equal to the unconditional
distribution F∆. This independence will be demonstrated at the end of the proof.
The left-hand side of (6) equals (7) because s2(x
∗
1, x
∗
1 + η∆) = 0 for η∆ < η
∗
∆,
s2(x
∗
1, x
∗
1 + η∆) = 1 for η∆ > η
∗
∆, and distribution of η∆|∂L1 equals the unconditional
distribution F∆.
Let us now turn to the right-hand side of (6). By the law of iterated expectations,
we can write it as E [U2 (x) |∂L2]. Next, for each value of η∆ ∈ [η∆, η∆], define x(η∆)
as the intersection of the boundary ∂L2 and line x2 = x1 + η∆. (We do not introduce
new symbol for the function x(·) which is a slight abuse of notation.) The intersection
exists and is unique. The existence is assured by the condition (II): for sufficiently
high x1, type (x1, x1 + η∆) exceeds x and then (x1, x1 + η∆) ∈ L2. For sufficiently low
x1, x1 < x
∗
1 and then (x1, x1 + η∆) /∈ L1 ⊇ L2. The uniqueness follows from the fact
that the strategy s is monotone and hence ∂L2 cannot contain x and x
′ such that
x > x′.
Using this notation, and the independence of η∆ from the event ∂L2, we can divide
the expectation E [U2 (x) |∂L2] into∫ η∗∆
η
∆
U2(x(η∆))dF∆(η∆) +
∫ η∆
η∗∆
U2(x(η∆))dF (η∆). (8)
The first integral is identical to the first integral in (7) because if η∆ < η
∗
∆ then
x(η∆) satisfies the indifference condition in round 2, U2(x(η∆)) = 0. To see this, note
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that type (x∗1, x
∗
1 + η∆) /∈ L2 because by the definition of η∗∆, s2(x∗1, x∗1 + η∆) = 0 for
η∆ < η
∗
∆. Then, by the monotonicity of s2, x(η∆) is in the interior of L1 for η∆ < η
∗
∆.
Thus in any neighborhood of x(η∆) there exist x
′ and x′′ such that s2(x′) = 0 and
s2(x
′′) = 1. Strategy s2(x) is assumed to be optimal in round 2 by the condition
(I), and hence U2(x
′) ≤ 0, U2(x′′) ≥ 0. Then U2(x(η∆)) = 0 from the continuity of
expectations with respect to the signals.
The second integral in (8) is identical to the second integral in (7) because if
η∆ > η
∗ then x(η∆) = (x∗1, x
∗
1 + η∆) as the type (x
∗
1, x
∗
1 + η∆) lies on the boundary
of L2. To see this, notice that s2(x
∗
1, x
∗
1 + η∆) = 1 by the definition of η
∗
∆; therefore
(x∗1, x
∗
1 + η∆) ∈ L2. On the other hand, (x∗1 − δ, x∗1 + η∆) /∈ L1 ⊇ L2 for any δ > 0.
We now complete the proof by showing that ηi1, η
i
2, and therefore η
i
∆ = η
i
2 − ηi1,
are independent of events ∂L1 and ∂L2. For t = 1, 2, we let dt(x) = x
∗
1 + d, where
d is equal to the distance of x from the boundary ∂Lt along the diagonal, i.e., x −
(d, d) ∈ ∂Lt. Notice that d1(x) is simply the first coordinate, d1(x1, x2) = x1. For
t = 2, mapping d2 defines for each x˜ a set {x ∈ X : d2(x) = x˜} which we call an
isosignal. We use the mapping d2 to index the parallel isosignals, as seen in Figure
5. The conditional joint distribution of errors is invariant to diagonal translations:
(ηi1, η
i
2)|x = (ηi1, ηi2)|
(
x + (d, d)
)
for any d ∈ R. Hence, by the construction of the
isosignals, distribution of (ηi1, η
i
2)|dt(xi) = x˜ is identical for each x˜ and thus also equal
to the unconditional distribution of (ηi1, η
i
2).
The second auxiliary lemma is a direct extension of the static Laplacian property.
Indeed, for t = 1 Lemma 2 coincides with the static case in Theorem 1. Thus, though
we write Lemma 2 generally for t = 1, 2, the reader may focus on the case t = 2.
Lemma 2. `t(θ)|∂Lt is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
As the threshold type x∗1 in the static game, the set ∂L2 constitutes a boundary
between the sets of types who do and do not participate in stage 2, respectively. The
set L2 is an upper contour set,
7 and hence the types participating in the stage 2 are
those above the boundary ∂L2. As in the static case, the information that player’s
type is on the boundary turns out to be entirely uninformative about the realized
proportion of players above the boundary. The following proof uses the invariance
of the type space to diagonal translations to reduce the two-dimensional problem of
Lemma 2 to a static problem, in which the one-dimensional Laplacian property holds.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let x˜it = dt(x
i), η˜it = x˜
i
t − θ, where dt was defined in the proof of
Lemma 1. We can interpret x˜it = dt(x
i) as a virtual private signal, and η˜it = x˜
i
t − θ
7We call S ⊆ X an upper contour set, if for all x,x′ ∈ X such that x′ ≥ x: if x ∈ S, then x′ ∈ S.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the argument supporting Lemma 2.
as a virtual error. The conditional distribution of θ|(xi1, xi2) is invariant to diagonal
translations, and therefore by the construction, the virtual error η˜it is independent
of x˜it and θ. From the definition of the virtual signal x˜
i
t = dt(x
i), event x˜it = x
∗
1 is
identical to the event xi ∈ ∂Lt and type xi participates in the stage t of the project,
xi ∈ Lt, if and only if x˜it ≥ x∗1. See Figure 5 for an illustration. Therefore
`t(θ) | ∂Lt = Pr
(
xj ∈ Lt|θ
) | ∂Lt = Pr (x˜jt > x∗1|θ) | x˜it = x∗1,
and the last conditional random variable is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] by the
static Laplacian property in Theorem 1.
The Laplacian property in the variant of the game from Figure 3 with the ir-
reversible investment and the delay option has an identical formulation. Threshold
type x∗1’s incentive to invest in round 1, taking into account the delay option, is again
D1 +D2 where Dt satisfies (5).
5 Equilibrium Uniqueness
In the previous section we constructed a convenient characterization of payoff expec-
tations at the threshold in round 1. This characterization did not require any direct
assumptions on the payoff functions. Rather, the Laplacian property was driven only
by the assumptions imposed on the information structure and on the examined strat-
egy profile. In this section, we introduce assumptions on the payoffs under which
the generalized Laplacian property plays a central role for the equilibrium charac-
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terization. We impose payoff monotonicities common in the global games literature
under which the game becomes dominance solvable and the unique rationalizable
actions are characterized in terms of payoff expectations of threshold types under
monotone strategy profiles. Then we review the results of Morris and Shin (2003) on
rationalizability in the static game (Proposition 1). The main result in this section
characterizes rationalizable actions in the dynamic game (Proposition 2).
First, we introduce global game assumptions sufficient for dominance solvability
of both the static and the dynamic game.
A1 Strict State Monotonicity: u1(θ, l1, l2) and u2(θ, l1, l2) are strictly increasing
in θ.
A2 Weak Action Monotonicity: Both u1(θ, l1, l2) and u2(θ, l1, l2) are non-decreasing
in l1 and l2.
A3 Dominance Regions:
A3a (lower and upper dominance regions in the static game): There
exist θ, θ such that u1(θ, l1, l2) + u2(θ, l1, l2) < 0 for all θ < θ, and all
l1, l2 ∈ [0, 1], l2 ≤ l1; and u1(θ, l1, l2) + u2(θ, l1, l2) > 0 for all θ > θ and all
l1, l2 ∈ [0, 1], l2 ≤ l1.
A3b (lower dominance region in round 1): There exists θ1 such that
u1(θ, l1, l2) < 0 for all θ < θ1 and all l1, l2 ∈ [0, 1], l2 ≤ l1.
A3c (upper dominance region in round 2): There exist θ2 such that
u2(θ, l1, l2) > 0 for all θ > θ2 and all l1, l2 ∈ [0, 1], l2 ≤ l1.
Assumption A1 states that projects with higher parameter θ are, ceteris paribus,
more profitable. Assumption A2 imposes rich strategic complementarities not only
within each round but also across the rounds. It assures that investing by any player
in any round increases the incentive to invest for all other players in both rounds.
Finally, in Assumption A3a–A3c we assume existence of dominance regions. These
assumption together assure that in both stages of the dynamic game and in the static
game, players with very high signals participate in the project and those with very
low signals do not participate. Assumption A3a assumes both dominance regions for
the static game directly. In the case of the dynamic game, players with very high
signals invest in round 1 by A3a, and so we only need to assure by A3b that those
with very low signals will not invest. Similarly, in A3c we need to assume only the
upper dominance region in round 2, because players with very low second signals will
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not participate in the second stage as they have not invested already in round 1 by
A3b.
We now review the results of Morris and Shin (2003) on rationalizability in the
static game. To examine rationalizable actions of type x1 in Γst, we return to the
symmetric monotone strategy profile s1 with threshold equal to x1 and define mst(x1)
as the expected payoff for action 1 of the threshold type x1. Using the Laplacian
property in the static game, we get
mst(x1) =
∫ 1
0
(
u1 (ϑ1(l1), l1, l1) + u2 (ϑ1(l1), l1, l1)
)
dl1,
where the right-hand side depends on x1 through ϑ1 (l1;x1). For the sake of brevity, we
omit the threshold value from the arguments of ϑt. Function mst(x1) is continuous,
strictly monotone by A1, and hence it attains 0 at a unique point. The following
proposition states that the static game Γst is dominance solvable, and it characterizes
the unique rationalizable action at each signal x1 (apart from the single point where
mst(x1) = 0).
Proposition 1. (Morris and Shin, 2003)
Action 1 (0) is the unique rationalizable action for type x1 in the static game Γst if
and only if mst(x1) > 0 (mst(x1) < 0).
Proof. See proof of Proposition 2.1 in Morris and Shin (2003).
Next we move to the dynamic setup. We use the concept of rationalizability in
the extensive form games introduced in Pearce (1984). However, due to the specific
features of our dynamic game, we avoid complications that generally arise in dy-
namic games. In particular, players in our game do not observe actions of the fellow
players, and hence no conjectures about the opponents’ strategies are ever refuted
in the progress of the play. For convenience we state here a simplified definition of
rationalizability particularly tailored to our game. Strategy profile is a mapping Σ(i)
specifying strategy for each player i. The best response set BR2(x,Σ) ⊆ {0, 1} of
type x in round 2 against profile Σ includes action 1 if U2(x) ≥ 0 and action 0 if
U2(x) ≤ 0 under the profile Σ. In round 1, BR1(x1,Σ) ⊆ {0, 1} includes action 1
if E[max{0, U2(x1, x2)}|x1] ≥ 0 and action 0 if E[max{0, U2(x1, x2)}|x1] ≤ 0 under
the profile Σ. We write Sk for the set of pure strategies s that are not eliminated
after k iterations. That is, we let S0 denote the set of all strategies, and define Sk
recursively for k > 0: Strategy (s1, s2) ∈ Sk if and only if (s1, s2) ∈ Sk−1 and for each
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type x = (x1, x2) ∈ X there exists strategy profile Σ such that Σ(i) ∈ Sk−1 for all
players i ∈ [0, 1] and
1. s2(x) ∈ BR2(x,Σ), or s1(x1) = 0,
2. s1(x1) ∈ BR1(x1,Σ).
The set of rationalizable strategies is S∗ =
⋂
k S
k. The set of rationalizable actions at
signal x1 at round 1 is the set of actions a1 ∈ {0, 1} for which there exists (s1, s2) ∈ S∗
so that s1(x1) = a1. The set of rationalizable actions at type x at round 2 is the set
of actions a2 ∈ {0, 1} for which there exists (s1, s2) ∈ S∗ so that s2(x) = a2.
As in the static case, we examine a monotone strategy profile with threshold x∗1 in
round 1 and the central object of the analysis will be the payoff expectation mdyn(x
∗
1)
in round 1 at a threshold signal x∗1. However, unlike in the static case, players have
the reversibility option and hence, to fully specify profile (s1, s2), we first need to
analyze the continuation game in round 2. Let Γ2(x
∗
1) denote the continuation game
induced from Γdyn by constraining players in round 1 to the monotone strategy s1(x
i
1)
with the threshold x∗1. The game Γ2(x
∗
1) is a static Bayesian game, as players have
no control about actions in round 1, and they only have a choice about s2(x
i). We
are interested in choices in round 2 only for types x ∈ L1(x∗1) as s2(x) of the types
x /∈ L1(x∗1) not investing in round 1 are not payoff relevant. For the sake of brevity,
let us constrain types x ∈ X \L1(x∗1) who have not invested in round 1 to s2(x) = 0.
This constraint does not affect best response correspondence of any type in L1(x
∗
1).
The following lemma states that the continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1) is dominance solvable,
and therefore, by specifying the threshold x∗1 in round 1, we uniquely determine the
strategy profile in the whole game. Moreover, the strategy profile is monotone and
satisfies conditions (I)–(II) from Section 4 and so the Laplacian property holds.
Lemma 3. For each x∗1, the continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1) has a unique rationalizable
strategy s2, which is monotone and s2(x) = 1 for sufficiently high types x.
Proof. In Appendix.
The proof of Lemma 3 consists of constructing the largest and smallest rationalizable
strategies by the contagion argument standardly used in the global game literature
and then showing that they coincide by an adaptation of the translation argument
from Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2003).
We define the function mdyn(x
∗
1) as the expected equilibrium payoff D1(x
∗
1) +
D2(x
∗
1) in the game Γ2(x
∗
1) formed conditional on the threshold signal x
∗
1 in round 1.
By Lemma 3, mdyn(x
∗
1) is uniquely defined. Additionally:
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Lemma 4. Function mdyn(x1) is strictly increasing and attains both positive and
negative values.
Proof. In Appendix.
By Lemma 4, there exists a unique threshold x∗∗1 satisfying mdyn(x1) > 0 for x1 > x
∗∗
1
and mdyn(x1) < 0 for x1 < x
∗∗
1 .
The following proposition states that the dynamic game Γdyn is dominance solv-
able. The dynamic game Γdyn has essentially a unique equilibrium; the equilibria can
differ only at the boundaries ∂Lt and off the equilibrium path, that is, in s2(x) of
those types x who did not invest in round 1.
Proposition 2. (i) Action 1 (0) is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 at
signal x1 in the dynamic game Γdyn if and only if mdyn(x1) > 0 (mdyn(x1) < 0).
(ii) The unique rationalizable action of type (x1, x2) with x1 > x
∗∗
1 in round 2 is
s2(x1, x2) where s2 is the unique rationalizable strategy in the continuation game
Γ2(x
∗∗
1 ).
Proof. In Appendix.
The proof is based on the usual contagion argument. Action 1 (symmetrically for
0) is dominant in round 1 of Γdyn at extreme signals in the upper dominance region.
Moreover, if action 1 is dominant in round 1 at all signals above x1 then mdyn(x1) is a
lower bound for payoff expectation of the type x1 in round 1. Hence, if mdyn(x1) > 0
then action 1 is serially dominant at some x′1 below but close to x1 by continuity of
expectations with respect to signals. The set of the signals at which action 1 (0) is
established to be serially dominant in round 1 can be iteratively expanded as long as
mdyn(x1) > 0 (mdyn(x1) < 0) on the boundary of the set. Hence, the contagion of
action 1 from above and of action 0 from below meet at the root of mdyn.
6 Strategic Effects of Reversibility
In this section we compare the equilibrium investment behavior across the dynamic
and the static game. The comparison will be simple thanks to the generalized Lapla-
cian property assuring that the payoff expectations of threshold types are based on
Laplacian belief in the both games.
From the previous section we know that the key objects for the analysis of
investment behavior are the functions mst and mdyn. To facilitate the compari-
son of mst and mdyn = D1 + D2, we decompose mst into mst = S1 + S2, where
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St(x
∗
1) =
∫ 1
0
ut(ϑ1(l1), l, l)dl is the expected payoff of the threshold type x
∗
1 in the
static game for stage t of the project. The following Lemma compares mst(x1) and
mdyn(x1) by parts.
Lemma 5. For each x1 ∈ R:
(i) S1(x1) ≥ D1(x1),
(ii) S2(x1) ≤ D2(x1).
Proof. (i) The monotonicity of u1 implies
S1 =
∫ 1
0
u1(ϑ1(l1), l1, l1)dl1 ≥
∫ 1
0
u1(ϑ1(l1), l1, λ2(l1))dl1 = D1, (9)
as the integrals differ only in the third argument of u1, and l1 ≥ l2 = λ2(l1).
(ii) Similarly, the monotonicity of u2 implies
S2 =
∫ 1
0
u2(ϑ1(l2), l2, l2)dl2 ≤
∫ 1
0
u2(ϑ2(l2), λ1(l2), l2)dl2 = D2. (10)
In this case, we used inequalities ϑ1(l2) ≤ ϑ2(l2) and l2 ≤ l1 = λ1(l2). To obtain the
first inequality recall that ϑ1(l) is the inverse function to `1(θ) and ϑ2(l) the inverse
function to `2(θ). Both `1 and `2 are increasing and `1(θ) ≥ `2(θ) for all θ, so the
opposite inequality holds for the inverse functions.
Let us discuss in brief how the inequalities in Lemma 5 change in the variant of the
game from Figure 3 with irreversible investment and the delay option. In the baseline
game l2 ≤ l1 because investment is reversible, but the opposite inequality l2 ≥ l1 holds
in the variant with the delay option as some of the players who have not invested in
round 1 can join the project in round 2. For this reason the inequalities in Lemma 5
attain opposite signs in the variant with the delay option. Below we continue with the
exposition only for the baseline game with the reversible investment, and the results
for the variant with the delay option can be obtained simply by reverting the signs
of the effects; see Table 1 for a summary.
We call the inequalities (i) and (ii) the first and the second stage effects. The two
effects have opposite signs and therefore the comparison of mst and mdyn is possible
only if we add further structure to the model. To discuss some structures that lead
to unambiguous comparisons, we introduce the following terminology: the payoffs do
not exhibit
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1. backward spillovers if u1(θ, l1, l2) does not depend on l2.
2. forward spillovers if u2(θ, l1, l2) does not depend on l1.
Such restrictions on payoffs can naturally arise in many economic situations. If
the players who exited the project do not hold any liability for the continuation of
the project, then, arguably, payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers because profits
from the early stage are not casually influenced by subsequent investment behavior.
Similarly, if production does not exhibit inertia, and profits are not redistributed
among the early and the late investors, then, arguably, payoffs do not exhibit forward
spillovers.
The first stage effect vanishes (S1 = D1) in the absence of backward spillovers. In
that case, players invest in the first round of the dynamic game more often than in
the static game:
Proposition 3. If the payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers then:
(i) If action 1 is the unique rationalizable action at x1 in Γst then 1 is the unique
rationalizable action at x1 in round 1 of Γdyn.
(ii) If action 0 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 at x1 in Γdyn then 0 is
the unique rationalizable action at x1 in Γst.
Proof. The proposition follows from the necessary and sufficient conditions for ra-
tionalizability stated in Propositions 1 and 2 and from the inequality mdyn(x1) =
D1(x1)+D2(x1) ≥ S1(x1)+S2(x1) = mst(x1) which holds in the absence of backward
spillovers.
Proposition 3 is summarized by the second row in Table 1 in the introduction.
Under the specified conditions, players invest on a larger set of signals in round 1 of
the dynamic game than in the static game, and so in this case the provision of the
exit option enhances investment in round 1. Provision of the delay option has the
opposite effect.
When the signals are very precise, the second stage effect vanishes (S2 = D2)
in the absence of forward spillovers, and we get a result analogous but opposite to
the one in Proposition 3.8 This will be formally formulated in the following section
8Unlike in the case of absence of backward spillovers in which the first stage effect vanishes even
for positive σ, the second stage effect vanishes in the absence of forward spillovers only in the limit
σ → 0. This is because in the latter case S2 and D2 differ also in the first argument of the payoff
function; u2(ϑ1(l2), ·, ·) vs. u2(ϑ2(l2), ·, ·). Proposition 8 below specifies a condition under which
this difference disappears in the limit of precise signals.
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where we continue in the comparison of the behavior across the dynamic and the
static game in the limit of precise signals. Importantly, in this limit we can also
characterize rationalizable behavior in round 2.
7 Limit Results
In this section we characterize the effects of reversibility in the limit of precise signals.
This limit is a natural domain of our model because we assume the uninformative
prior, which is a good approximation of a general prior if the private signals are precise.
Formally, we will examine sequences of the static and the dynamic games with varying
scale of noise, σ. Games with the scaling parameter equal to σ are denoted by Γst(σ)
or Γdyn(σ), and Γst, Γdyn without the argument denote in this section whole classes of
games (Γ(σ))σ rather than particular games. We will examine coordination outcome
in games Γst(σ) and Γdyn(σ) when Nature draws fundamental with a value θ
∗, when
σ → 0+.
We say that action (history) h ∈ {0, 1, 10, 11} is selected at θ∗ in Γst, respectively
in Γdyn, if there exists σ > 0 such that for all σ ∈ (0, σ] all players in Γst(σ), re-
spectively in Γdyn(σ), reach action history h whenever Nature draws the fundamental
θ∗ and all players play according to rationalizable strategies. Naturally, only actions
h ∈ {0, 1} can be selected in Γst. By saying that action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn we
specify that all players play action 1 in round 1, and we leave the continuation play
in round 2 unspecified.
We start by describing action selection in the static game. There
lim
σ→0+
mst(x1, σ) = m
∗
st(x1) =
∫ 1
0
(
u1(x1, l, l) + u2(x1, l, l)
)
dl,
and m∗st(x1) is strictly increasing and continuous. The following proposition follows
directly from Proposition 2.1 in Morris and Shin (2003) and from the assumption of
bounded errors.
Proposition 4. Action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γst if and only if m∗st(θ
∗) > 0. Action 0
is selected at θ∗ in Γst if and only if m∗st(θ
∗) < 0.
We now turn to the dynamic game. To simplify the formulation of limit re-
sults in the dynamic game, we will focus on setups in which the limit m∗dyn(x1) =
limσ→0+mdyn(x1, σ) exists is continuous and strictly increasing in x1. To assure the
existence of the limit, in this section we constrain our attention to signal structures
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in which ηi2 and η
i
∆ = η
i
2 − ηi1 are independent.9 In statistical terms, this means that
xi2 is sufficient statistics of (x
i
1, x
i
2) for θ. In such case, the first signal x
i
1 = x
i
2−σηi∆ is
an uninformative coarsening of the second signal xi2 = θ + ση
i
2. This signal structure
is a special case of the signal structure considered up to now. The advantage of xi2
being a sufficient statistic is that it keeps the analysis in round 2 one-dimensional as
players in round 2 condition only on xi2 and not on x
i
1.
10
Lemma 6. If ηi2 and η
i
∆ = η
i
2 − ηi1 are independent and, in addition to the previous
assumptions, u2(θ, l1, l2) is strictly increasing l2, then the limit limσ→0+ mdyn(x1, σ)
exists is continuous and strictly increasing in x1.
Proof. In Appendix.
All the remaining results in this section are proven under the assumption that
the limit exists, is continuous and is strictly increasing, but without a direct use of
the independency assumption (or the existence of the sufficient statistic). Therefore
the results remain valid under any other sufficient condition for the statement in
Lemma 6.
The characterization of the selected action in round 1 of the dynamic game is
analogous to the one in the static game.
Proposition 5. Action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn if and only if m∗dyn(θ
∗) > 0. Action
0 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn if and only if m∗dyn(θ
∗) < 0.
Proof. In Appendix.
Proposition 5 specifies only the action played in round 1 of the dynamic game.
In order to characterize the strategic effects of the reversibility option on the final
coordination outcome, we also need to characterize the continuation play in round 2:
Proposition 6. Suppose action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn. Then:
(i) If
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 < 0 then action history 10 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
(ii) If
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 > 0 then action history 11 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
Proof. In Appendix.
9A special case of this signal structure is also used in Heidhues and Melissas (2006).
10In the general case, when players in round 2 need to condition on both signals, the set of
indifference points in round 2 is characterized by a functional equation, and analysis of the limit
becomes cumbersome.
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Let us discuss Proposition 6. First, the selected continuation play in round 2
depends solely on the payoff function u2 and is independent of u1; there is no inter-
play in between the two stages of the project in this result. Second, the condition∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 ≶ 0 has an intuitive interpretation. Imagine first a game in which
all players must participate in stage 1 of the project and can only choose whether to
continue into stage 2. Then
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 < 0 is the condition under which the
coordination failure is selected at θ∗ in this imaginary static global game. The coor-
dination problem of players in round 2 of the dynamic game with endogenous entry
is more severe because they are unsure of participation l1 ≤ 1 in stage 1, and hence
the condition
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 < 0 implies coordination on exit also in Γdyn with the
voluntary participation in stage 1. On the other hand, if
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 > 0 then
coordination on staying in the project is selected in the imaginary static global game.
The same inequality happens to imply that coordination on staying in the project is
selected at θ∗ even if participation in stage 1 is voluntary.
We now examine the selected coordination outcome at θ∗ under the condition∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 > 0.11 The following two propositions extend the result in Proposi-
tion 3 by comparing coordination outcomes across the static and the dynamic game
when payoffs do not exhibit either backward or forward spillovers. Suppose first that
payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers. Then, the first stage effect discussed in the
previous section vanishes, and hence m∗st(θ
∗) ≤ m∗dyn(θ∗) by the second stage effect.
In that case, efficient coordination is selected in Γdyn on a larger set of fundamentals
than in Γst:
Proposition 7. If payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers, and
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 >
0 then:
(i) If action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γst then action history 11 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
(ii) If action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn then action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γst.
Proof. We showed that mdyn(x1, σ) ≥ mst(x1, σ) for any x1 and σ in the absence of
backward spillovers, and so m∗dyn(x1) ≥ m∗st(x1) for all x1.
(i) If action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γst then 0 < m∗st(θ
∗) ≤ m∗dyn(θ∗) and so action
1 is selected at θ∗ in round 1 of Γdyn. Then, by Proposition 6, action history 11 is
selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
11The analysis of the exit option becomes trivial in the other case, in which
∫ 1
0
u2(θ∗, 1, l2)dl2 < 0.
Then, whenever Nature draws θ∗ and σ is small, all players already know in round 1 that they will
not participate in stage 2 of the project, and the second stage becomes vacuous.
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(ii) If action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn then 0 > m∗dyn(θ
∗) ≥ m∗st(θ∗) and hence
action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γst.
If payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers then the second stage effect vanishes
in the limit of precise signals, and hence m∗st(θ
∗) ≥ m∗dyn(θ∗) by the first stage effect.
Then efficient coordination is selected in Γdyn at a smaller set of fundamentals than
in Γst. However, this mirror image of the previous proposition holds only in the limit
of precise signals and under the condition in the following proposition:
Proposition 8. If payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers and
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 > 0
then:
(i) If action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn then action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γst.
(ii) If action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γst then action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
Proof. In the supplement to this proof in Appendix we show that if
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 >
0 and payoffs do not exhibit forward spillovers then m∗dyn(x1) ≤ m∗st(x1).
(i) If action 1 is selected at θ∗ in round 1 of Γdyn then 0 < m∗dyn(θ
∗) ≤ m∗st(θ∗) and
so action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γst.
(ii) If action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γst then 0 > m∗st(θ
∗) ≥ m∗dyn(θ∗) and hence
action 0 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn.
A simple corollary of the last two propositions is that if payoffs exhibit neither
backward nor forward spillovers and
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 > 0, then the selected coordi-
nation outcome is identical at θ∗ across the static and the dynamic game. Another
case in which the coordination outcome is identical at θ∗ across the two games arises
when u2(θ
∗, 0, 0) > 0. Then, when Nature selects θ∗, each player knows already in
round 1 that all players who participate in stage 1 will continue into stage 2 of the
project, and so the reversibility option becomes vacuous.
Apart from those two cases, the option affects the coordination outcome on a
large set of fundamentals, and the effect does not disappear as σ → 0+. Although the
reversibility option is in the unique equilibrium of Γdyn(σ) exercised by a vanishing
set of types in the limit σ → 0+, the player observing the equilibrium threshold signal
x∗∗1 will use the option with a positive probability which does not vanish as σ → 0+.
Such a player has a pivotal role in the equilibrium analysis, and hence the option
remains to have non-trivial consequences even as σ → 0+. We illustrate this point
in the next subsection where we explicitly compute the equilibrium of the dynamic
game in a particular but tractable limit.
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7.1 Example
In this example we analyze the dynamic game in an ordered limit that sends precisions
of both signals to infinity, but the precision of the second signal increases more quickly.
We use the error structure xi1 = x
i
2− σ1ηi∆, xi2 = θ+ σ2ηi2, with ηi∆ independent of ηi2,
and examine the ordered limit limσ1→0+ limσ2→0+ .
In the ordered limit, the relationship between l1 and l2 becomes simple. Let
x∗2 = x
∗
1+σ1η
∗ for some fixed x∗1, σ1, η
∗, and let us introduce l∗1 = `1(x
∗
2) = 1−F1 (−η∗).
Then, as σ2 → 0+
l2 = λ2(l1) =
{
0 if l1 < l
∗
1,
l1 if l1 > l
∗
1,
l1 = λ1(l2) =
{
l∗1 if l2 < l
∗
1,
l2 if l2 > l
∗
1.
(11)
The intuition is the following: Under the described strategy profile, players in round
2 extract from their very precise signals xi2 very precise information about l1. In the
limit σ2 → 0+, all players exit in round 2 whenever `1(θ) < l∗1 at the realized θ, and
all players stay in round 2 whenever `1(θ) > l
∗
1.
The expression for the expected incentive to invest of the threshold type x∗2 in
round 2 is simple in the ordered limit as well. Using the above definition of l∗1, the
indifference condition in round 2 can be expressed in the ordered limit as
1
l∗1
∫ l∗1
0
u2(x
∗
1, l
∗
1, l2)dl2 = 0, (12)
when u2(x
∗
1, 0, 0) < 0 and
∫ 1
0
u2(x
∗
1, 1, l2)dl2 > 0. See (17) in Proof of Lemma 6, for
the out of the limit expression.
Then, in the non-trivial cases,12
lim
σ1→0+
lim
σ2→0+
mdyn(x1, σ1, σ2) =
∫ 1
0
u1(x1, l1, λ2(l1))dl1 +
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, λ1(l2), l2)dl2,
where λt(·) are given by (11) and l∗1 is the unique solution of (12). Let us mention that
in the ordered limit the function m∗dyn(x1) and, consequently the selected coordination
outcome, is noise independent — it does not depend on the assumed error distribution.
The solution that we sketched here for the ordered limit can be extended also to the
analysis of an unordered limit in which both σ1 → 0, σ2 → 0, with their ratio kept
constant. However, the solution will depend on the error distribution in that case.
12See cases (a) or (b) in Proof of Lemma 6 for analysis of the trivial cases when u2(x∗1, 0, 0) > 0
or
∫ 1
0
u2(x∗1, 1, l2)dl2 < 0.
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Figure 6: Comparison of functions m∗st(x1) and m
∗
dyn(x1) in the ordered limit.
As an illustration of the solution in the ordered limit, we depict in Figure 6 the
limit functions m∗st(x1) and m
∗
dyn(x1) for the payoff functions
u1(θ, l1, l2) = θ − 1 + l1, u2(θ, l1, l2) = θ − 1 + l1 + l2
2
.
The illustrative payoffs do not exhibit backward spillovers and so, in accordance with
Proposition 7, coordination on successful investment is selected in the dynamic game
on a larger set of fundamentals than in the static one. This effect does not disappear
in the limit despite the fact that, by Proposition 6, the investors do not exercise
their exit option apart from the types in a vanishing neighborhood of the equilibrium
threshold x∗1. The effect remains significant in the limit because the types in the
neighborhood of x∗∗1 use the exit option with a positive probability and hence the
investment profiles λ1(l2) 6= l2 and λ2(l1) 6= l1 even in the limit, which translates into
the significant difference between the functions m∗st(x1) and m
∗
dyn(x1).
8 Further Generalization of the Laplacian Prop-
erty
In this Section, we sketch out Laplacian property in environments extending the
baseline dynamic game. We abstract here from the particular economic problem of
reversible investment analyzed elsewhere in the paper and explore the generality of
property.
A continuum of players indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] make a finite sequence of binary
decisions. Let hi denote a private action history of player i: We write ∅ for the empty
action history at the beginning of the game and write hiai for the private action
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history of player i who has chosen action ai ∈ {0, 1} at hi; letter H denotes the set of
attainable action histories. History z ∈ H is called terminal, if z0, z1 /∈ H. We denote
Z the set of all terminal histories and T = H \ Z the set of transient histories. We
endow the set of terminal histories Z by the lexicographical order ≺. If two terminal
histories z and z′ differ in the length then their order is determined based on the first
d actions, where d is length of the shorter history. Note that the set Z is completely
and strictly ordered by the above order because otherwise there would exist z and z′
such that z′ would be a continuation of z which would contradict z being terminal.
We denote the minimal and the maximal terminal history by z and z. See Figure 7
for illustrations of this notation.
s
HHHHHH
∅
s
 
 
 
@
@
@
0
s
00
s
01
s
 
 
 
@
@
@
1
s
10
s
11
s




Q
Q
Q
Q
∅
s
0
s




Q
Q
Q
Q
1
s
10
s




Q
Q
Q
Q
11
s
110
s
111
(a) Transient histories T = {∅, 0, 1},
terminal hist. Z = {00, 01, 10, 11},
00 ≺ 01 ≺ 10 ≺ 11.
(b) Transient histories T = {∅, 1, 11},
terminal hist. Z = {0, 10, 110, 111},
0 ≺ 10 ≺ 110 ≺ 111.
Figure 7: Examples of general games.
We again interpret this game as an investment game and z ∈ Z as feasible levels
of participation in an investment project with z being an outside option. We think
of a player reaching z′  z as participating more actively in the project than a player
reaching z. For z  z let lz denote measure of players whose participation level is at
least z and l = (lz)zz is the tuple of lz.
The payoff at a terminal action history z ∈ Z is ∑z′z uz′(θ, l), and we normalize
payoff function uz for the outside option z to 0. The function uz represents the
payoff for increasing participation from the predecessor of z to z. The additive payoff
structure is without loss of generality.
The information structure is the extension of the one in the baseline model. Nature
draws θ from improper uniform distribution on R, and at each transient action history
h ∈ T that player reaches she observes a private signal xih = θ + σηih, with the
errors ηih i.i.d. across players and independent from θ. The tuple of errors (η
i
h)h∈T
is drawn from an atomless joint distribution with a compact convex support. Bold
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letter xi = (xih)h∈T denotes type of player i and x
i
h denotes history of private signals
observed up to h, including the signal at h if h is transient. Strategy s = (sh)h∈T is
a tuple of functions sh each mapping signal history x
i
h to action in {0, 1}.
For a fixed symmetric strategy profile s, let vh(xh) be the expected payoff of a
player at history h with a signal history xh who follows s from h onward:
vh(xh) = E[vhsh(xh)(xhsh(xh)) | xh],
for any transient history h ∈ T and let vz(xz) = E[
∑
z′z uz′(θ, l) | xz] for any
terminal history z ∈ Z.
As in the description of the Laplacian property in Section 4, we restrict our at-
tention to monotone strategies s. We denote the threshold signal at the beginning
of the game by x∗∅. We again require s to be optimal at all histories except for the
starting history ∅. For each h ∈ T \ {∅} and for all types x that reach h,
sh(xh) ∈ arg max
a∈{0,1}
E [vha(xha) | xh] .
Furthermore, we restrict attention to s under which sufficiently high types reach the
maximal participation level z.
For a fixed symmetric strategy profile s, we let Lz be the set of types x that
reach the participation of at least z. Notice that the lexicographical order on Z
and the cumulative definition of lz and of Lz are purely notational structures, and
they do not impose any restrictions on the game. With this notation, and with the
assumption that the considered stratefy s is monotone, Lz is a decreasing sequence
of upper contour sets, Lz ⊆ Lz′ for z  z′, which will play an important role below.
For any transient history h we introduce zh to be the minimal participation at-
tainable from h. That is, a player who has reached h has committed herself to
participation of at least zh. For each h we abbreviate the boundary ∂Lzh1 to Bh. The
set Bh is the boundary separating types who reach z  zh1 from types who reach
a participation below zh1. Note that B∅ is simply the set of types who receive the
threshold signal x∗∅ at the beginning of the game.
Our aim is to compute the incentive to invest as expected by the threshold type
x∗∅ at the beginning of the game. For that purpose, but more generally, we introduce
the following objects. For each transient history h we define:
∆h = E[vh1(xh1)− vh0(xh0) | Bh],
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and let ∆z = 0 for all terminal histories z. Our main object of interest is ∆∅ which
is the incentive to play action 1 instead of 0 as expected by the threshold type x∗∅ at
the beginning of the game. Our tool for finding ∆∅ is the following recursive formula:
∆h = ∆h0 + ∆h1 + E[vh10(xh10)− vh01(xh01) | Bh], (13)
where we make a convention that if history ha is terminal then vhaa′(xhaa′) is replaced
by vha(xha).
To establish (13) we explore the expected payoff for playing 1 or 0 at transient
history h conditional on Bh:
E[vh1(xh1) | Bh] = E
[(
1− sh1(xh1)
)
vh10(xh10) + sh1(xh1)vh11(xh11) | Bh
]
,
because a player reaches h10 if she plays sh1(xh1) = 0 at h1 and reaches h11 if
sh1(xh1) = 1. The next, central step is to recognize that
E [sh1(xh1) (vh11(xh11)− vh10(xh10)) | Bh] = E [vh11(xh11)− vh10(xh10) | Bh1] = ∆h1,
(14)
which is a generalization of Lemma 1.
xi∅
xi0 = x
i
1
X
0
B0 = ∂L01
B∅ = ∂L10
B1 = ∂L11
Figure 8: Type space and the boundaries Bh in the game from Figure 7a.
Let us discuss the identity (14) on a particular example of the game from Figure
7a. In this game, the type (xi∅, x
i
0, x
i
1) is a three-dimensional vector, but, to allow for
a two-dimensional representation, let us consider a signal distribution under which xi0
and xi1 are identical. Then we can depict the type space X and boundaries B∅ = ∂L10,
B0 = ∂L01, B1 = ∂L11 as in Figure 8. Let h = ∅. The left-hand side of (14)
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is the expected value of the option to choose participation level z = 11 instead of
10 in history 1 with the expectation formed conditional on the boundary B∅ at the
beginning of the game. As in the case of Lemma 1, the expression (14) claims that
this option advantage can be transformed to an advantage of superior information B1
instead of B∅. As in the proof of Lemma 1, this argument is based on replacing the
types x on B∅ who do not play 1 at history 1 (so that s1(x1) = 0) with the types x′ on
the boundary B1 that play 1 but are indifferent between investing and not investing
(so that E[v11(x
′
11) − v10(x′10) | x′1] = 0). In doing such a replacement, we use that
the examined strategy profile is assumed to be optimal in the continuation game and
that the sets Lz are upper contour sets. We omit the formal proof of (14).
Using (14) we get
E[vh1(xh1) | Bh] = ∆h1 + E [vh10(xh10) | Bh] ,
and by a careful relabeling of actions we get
E[vh0(xh0) | Bh] = −∆h0 + E [vh01(xh01) | Bh] .
The recursive formula (13) is the difference of the last two expressions.
Let us now apply the recursive formula (13) on the two exemplary games in Figure
7. We start with the game in Figure 7a. Applying (13) we get
∆∅ = ∆0 + ∆1 + E[v10(x10)− v01(x01) | B∅] = E[u01 | B0] + E[u11 | B1] + E[u10 | B∅] =
=
∑
z∈{01,10,11}
E[uz(θ, l) | ∂Lz].
Each of the sets L01, L10, and L11 is an upper contour set which allows for a
simple generalization of Lemma 2. As in that case, information that a type is on
the boundary ∂Lz turns out not to contain any information about proportion of the
fellow players above the boundary, and hence lz | ∂Lz is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. Therefore
∆∅ =
∑
z∈{01,10,11}
∫ 1
0
u˜z(lz)dlz,
where u˜z(lz) denotes uz(θ, . . . , lz′ , . . . , ) with θ and lz′ , z
′ 6= z, treated as functions of
lz induced by the examined strategy profile s.
Generally, we need to apply the recursive formula (13) repeatedly. As an il-
lustration, consider the game in Figure 7b. Applying (13) the first time we get
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∆∅ = E[u10(θ, l) | B∅] + ∆1. When examining ∆1 we can ignore the payoff term u10
because it is a part of the payoff at all terminal histories that can be reached from
history 1. Applying (13) again, ∆1 = E[u110(θ, l) | B1] + ∆11, and applying (13) the
last time, we get
∆∅ = E[u10(θ, l) | B∅]+E[u110(θ, l) | B1]+E[u111(θ, l) | B11] =
∑
z∈{10,110,111}
E[uz(θ, l) | ∂Lz].
Using that lz | ∂Lz is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] we get
∆∅ =
∑
z∈{10,110,111}
∫ 1
0
u˜z(lz)dlz.
This method is general. For any dynamic game described in this section, the
iterative application of the recursive formula (13) will express the incentive ∆∅ of the
threshold type x∗∅ to invest at the beginning of the game as a linear combination of
the integrals
∫ 1
0
u˜z(lz)dlz with positive integer weights.
If we, as in Section 5, impose the global game assumptions on the payoff functions
uz (state monotonicity, monotonicity in lz, existence of the dominance regions) then
the game becomes dominance solvable and the unique rationalizable action at history
∅ for type x∅ can be characterized by the sign of ∆∅(x∅) in the same manner as
the sign of mdyn(x1) determined the unique rationalizable action in Proposition 2.
The comparison of investment across the static and the dynamic game in Section 6
was based on a further restriction of the payoff structure uz(θ, . . . , lz, . . . ) motivated
by our economic application. Comparative results of a similar nature can be based
on alternative economically meaningful restrictions of the payoff structure stemming
from different economic applications which we plan to explore in future research.
9 Conclusion
Economically relevant coordination problems are rarely static. Typically, they are dy-
namic processes in which economic agents can postpone irreversible decisions in order
to acquire additional information. We developed a modeling framework that incorpo-
rates learning and (ir)reversibility without compromising analytical tractability. The
framework allows for a qualitative assessment of the reversibility effects based only
on two features observable by an outside modeler. The first relevant feature is the
(ir)reversibility of actions available to the economic agents, and the second feature is
the structure of the intertemporal payoff spillovers in between different stages of the
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coordination process. Based on these two features, the modeler or a policy maker can
assess the effects of the reversibility option as summarized in Table 1 on page 4.
The applicability of this dynamic framework can be demonstrated on the economic
problems discussed in the introduction. The problem studied in Morris and Shin
(2004) consisted of an investment project with reversible investment and irreversible
safe action, which conforms to the left column in Table 1. It is conceivable that
the investment project exhibits forward payoff spillovers because a higher level of
investment in the early stage may ceteris paribus increase profits in the late stage of
the project due to inertia in the production process. On the contrary, the backward
payoff spillovers are unlikely because the instantaneous profit from the first stage
should not be causally influenced by the investment level in the later stage. This
structure of the payoff spillovers is corresponds to the second row of Table 1 and thus
the players coordinate more efficiently in the dynamic game than in the benchmark
static one without the option. Although, as found by Morris and Shin, the exit option
could lead in the interim stage of the project to inefficient runs, this is in this case
more than offset by the valuable flexibility provided by the option. The opposite effect
arises if the structure of the payoff spillovers is preserved but, instead of the option
to revert the investment, players have the option to delay (Heidhues and Melissas
2006, Section 3.2 falls into this category). The provision of the delay option hampers
efficient coordination in this case.
In other cases, the structure of the payoff spillovers may differ. In some appli-
cations of the regime changes games,13 the success of the attack and the payoffs for
the participation in the early and the late wave of the attack will depend only on the
final size of the attack l2 (as assumed in Dasgupta 2007). In such cases the payoffs
exhibit only backward but no forward spillovers, the delay option enhances and the
exit option hampers the efficient coordination.
It is useful to summarize here the logical structure that leads from the gener-
alized Laplacian property to the characterization of the reversibility effects. First,
the Laplacian property is a property of the strategy profile and of the information
structure; no direct assumptions on the payoffs are needed. We imposed the global
game assumptions on the payoffs only in the second part of the argument. That
assured that the monotone strategy profiles in which the Laplacian property holds
are relevant for the equilibrium analysis of the examined game. The third part of
the argument was based on the simple structure of the examined investment game
13Static games of regime change are used to model currency attacks (Morris and Shin 1998),
bank runs (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005) or revolutions (Edmond 2008). The attack in these models
succeeds if its size exceeds a critical level.
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by which we could unambiguously compare investment levels l1 and l2. This last step
allowed us to compare rationalizable actions across the dynamic and static game.
Functions mst and mdyn can be compared also under other restrictions than those we
imposed on the intertemporal payoff spillovers. For instance it is easy to show that if
payoff satisfy u1 = αu2 and they depend (apart on θ) only on the sum l1 +αl2, where
α is a positive constant, then mst(x1) ≤ mdyn(x1).
In Section 8 we sketched the Laplacian property in a large set of dynamic coor-
dination problems. The second step, in which we combined Laplacian property with
global games payoffs and have got equilibrium uniqueness, can be also generalized in
a direct manner. A modification of the third step provides a promising opportunity
for future research. That is, the new research should identify economically relevant
restrictions of the game structure from Section 8 that would allow for comparison
of incentives of threshold types, and thus also equilibrium behavior, across different
games.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3. For convenience, we let σ = 1 in this proof.
In the first step we analyze the maximal and the minimal rationalizable strategy
in the continuation game Γ2(x
∗
1). This problem is analyzed in van Zandt and Vives
(2007) for general Bayesian games with strategic complementarities, but our problem
differs in certain details of the setup, such as continuous vs. discrete set of players,
and so we give a direct argument.
The existence of the upper dominance region (by A3c) assures that there exists
x1 ≥ x∗1 such that for all (x1, x2) ∈ X satisfying x1 ≥ x1 action 1 is dominant at
(x1, x2) in Γ2(x
∗
1).
Using notation L1(x1) = {(x′1, x′2) ∈ X : x′1 ≥ x1}, let us define: L(1)2 = L1(x1)
and L
(1)
2 = L1(x
∗
1). The sets L
(1)
2 , L
(1)
2 are upper contour sets and L
(1)
2 ⊆ L(1)2 . Action
1 is dominant in Γ2(x
∗
1) on L
(1)
2 and action 0 is dominant everywhere on L1(x
∗
1) \L(1)2
(because this is an empty set).
For L2 ⊆ L1 ⊆ X, x ∈ X let U˜2(x, L1, L2) be the expected payoff E[u2(θ, l1, l2)|xi]
if the set opponents’ types who invest in round 1 is L1 and the set opponents’s types
who invest in both rounds is L2.
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Next, let us define for k = 1, 2 . . .
L
(k+1)
2 =
{
x ∈ X : U˜2
(
x, L1(x
∗
1), L
(k)
2
)
> 0
}
,
L
(k+1)
2 =
{
x ∈ X : U˜2
(
x, L1(x
∗
1), L
(k)
2
)
≥ 0
}
.
By induction, action 1 is unique rationalizable action in Γ2(x
∗
1) on types in L
(k)
2 and 0
is unique rationalizable action in Γ2(x
∗
1) on types in L1(x
∗
1)\L(k)2 after k iterations. The
sets L
(k)
2 , L
(k)
2 are upper contour sets and satisfy the following properties: L
(k)
2 ⊆ L(k)2
and L
(k+1)
2 ⊆ L(k)2 , L(k+1)2 ⊇ L(k)2 for all k.
Next we define sets L2 =
⋃
k L
(k)
2 and L2 =
⋂
k L
(k)
2 . Action 1 is the unique
rationalizable action on L2 and action 0 is the unique rationalizable action on L1(x
∗
1)\
L2. From the properties of sets L
(k)
2 , L
(k)
2 , the sets L2, L2 are upper contour sets and
L2 ⊇ L2.
In the second step, based on the translation argument in Frankel, Morris, and
Pauzner (2003), we prove that interiors of the sets L2 and L2 are identical. Because
the sets are upper contour sets, it suffices to prove that their boundaries are equal;
∂L2 = ∂L2. Let us suppose by contradiction that ∂L2 6= ∂L2.
Let us recall notation from Section 2: ηi∆ ∈ [η∆, η∆] denotes errors’ difference
ηi2−ηi1, and with σ = 1 we also have ηi∆ = xi2−xi1. In addition, let x : [η∆, η∆]→ ∂L2
and x : [η
∆
, η∆] → ∂L2 denote the intersections of the line x2 − x1 = η∆ with ∂L2
and ∂L2, respectively.
By Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the largest and the smallest rationalizable strat-
egy each constitutes a symmetric equilibrium in Γ2(x
∗
1). Hence, for those η∆ for which
x(η∆) lies in the interior of L1(x
∗
1), the type x(η∆) must satisfy the indifference con-
dition, U˜2 (x(η∆), L1(x
∗
1), L2) = 0.
14 Similarly, U˜2
(
x(η∆), L1(x
∗
1), L2
)
= 0 if x(η∆) lies
in the interior of L1(x
∗
1).
Another property of the functions x(η∆), x(η∆) is that x(η∆) ≥ x(η∆) for all
η∆ because the sets L2, L2 are upper contour sets and L2 ⊆ L2. As the last prop-
erty we note that functions x(η∆), x(η∆) are continuous: take η0 and x0 = x(η0)
(symmetrically for x) and consider a ball in X with radius r around x0. Then x(η)
lies in this ball whenever |η − η0| < r/2. This is because x0 + (0, r′) ∈ L2 and
x0 + (−32r′,−12r′) /∈ L2 when r′ < r/2, and both these points lie in the ball.
Now we define function ζ : [η
∆
, η∆] → [0,+∞) as ζ(η∆) = x1(η∆) − x1(η∆)
where x1, x1 are the first coordinates of x, x. Value ζ(η∆) ≥ 0 for all η∆ because
x1(η∆) ≥ x1(η∆). The function ζ is continuous and hence it attains a maximum
14Note that U˜2 (x(η∆), L1(x∗1), L2) ≥ 0 may be positive if x(η∆) ∈ ∂L1(x∗1).
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on the compact set [η
∆
, η∆] at some value η
∗
∆. The maximal value ζ(η
∗
∆) is strictly
positive if the boundaries ∂L2 and ∂L2 differ.
Let Td(S) be a translation operator that translates a set S ∈ X by distance d in
the direction of diagonal: Td(S) = {x ∈ X : x− d · (1, 1) ∈ S}. Let us introduce
U(x) = U˜2(x, L1(x
∗
1), L2),
U(x) = U˜2(x, L1(x
∗
1), L2),
U
′
(x) = U˜2
(
x, L1(x
∗
1), Tζ(η∗∆)(L2)
)
.
By construction Tζ(η∗∆)(L2) is a subset of the closure of L2 and therefore by action
monotonicity U
′
(x) ≤ U(x) for all x. Also, U ′(x) > U (x− ζ(η∗∆) · (1, 1)) because
type x under Tζ(η∗∆)(L2) has identical belief about the aggregate action in round 2 as
type x−ζ(η∗∆)·(1, 1) under L2, but the belief of the latter about (θ, l1) is stochastically
dominated (in the sense of the first order stochastic dominance) by the belief about
(θ, l1) of the former type; strict inequality holds because u2 strictly increases in θ.
Finally, let us consider the type x(η∗∆) = x(η
∗
∆) + ζ(η
∗
∆)(1, 1). If the boundaries
∂L2 and ∂L2 differ then the type x(η
∗
∆) lies in the interior of L1(x
∗
1) because x
∗
1 ≤
x1(η
∗
∆) < x1(η
∗
∆). Hence, the type x(η
∗
∆) satisfies the indifference condition under L2
and hence U(x(η∗∆)) = 0. On one hand, U
′(x(η∗∆)) ≤ U(x(η∗∆)) = 0, but on the other
hand U ′(x(η∗∆)) > U(x(η
∗
∆)) ≥ 0 which establishes the contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. We again let σ = 1 in the proof.
We obtain mdyn(x
∗
1) > 0 for sufficiently high x
∗
1 by the existence of the upper
dominance region (by A3a), and mdyn(x
∗
1) < 0 for sufficiently low x
∗
1 by the existence
of the lower dominance region (by A3a in combination with A3b).
Let us consider sets L
(k)
2 (x1) as defined for the continuation game Γ2(x1) in the
proof of Lemma 3 when all players use strategy with threshold x1 in round 1. From the
definition of L
(1)
2 , we have L
(1)
2 (x
′
1) = Tx′1−x1
(
L
(1)
2 (x1)
)
where Td(·) is the translation
operator defined in Proof of Lemma 3. By the strict state monotonicity A1,
U˜2(x, L1, L2) < U˜2 (x + (d, d), Td(L1), Td(L2)) (15)
for any d > 0. Using this monotonicity property iteratively, we get L
(k)
2 (x
′
1) ⊇
Tx′1−x1
(
L
(k)
2 (x1)
)
for any x′1 > x1, and therefore L2(x
′
1) ⊇ Tx′1−x1 (L2(x1)) for any
x′1 > x1.
Then, if x′1 > x1, Dt(x
′
1) > Dt(x1) for t = 1, 2 because round 1 belief at signal
x′1 about (θ, l1, l2) under strategy profile induced by the sets L1(x
′
1), L2(x
′
1) dominate
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round 1 belief at signal x1 about (θ, l1, l2) under L1(x1), L2(x1). The strict inequality
follows from the strict state monotonicity A1. Therefore mdyn(x1) = D1(x1)+D2(x1)
is strictly increasing in x1.
Proof of Proposition 2. From the existence of the dominance regions in round 1 of
the dynamic game15, there exists x1 (x1) such that action 1 (0) is strictly dominant in
round 1 for signals x1 > x1 (x1 < x1). Function mdyn(x1) is strictly positive (negative)
for x1 ≥ x1 (x1 ≤ x1).
Suppose action 1 is the strict best response in round t at type x under the sym-
metric profile consisting of the minimal rationalizable strategy s. Then 1 is the unique
rationalizable action in round t at type x. For this to hold, there must exist k (de-
pendent on x) such that action 1 is at x in round t the strict best response against sk
where sk is the minimal strategy in Sk. This holds because sk converges pointwise to
s, and therefore sk differs from s on a arbitrarily small set of types for a sufficiently
high k.
Suppose next that there exists x′1 such that mdyn(x
′
1) > 0 and action 1 is the
unique rationalizable action in round 1 for all x1 ≥ x′1. Then the expected payoff for
playing 1 in round 1 on signal x′1 against the minimal rationalizable strategy s is at
least mdyn(x
′
1) > 0. The payoff expectation is continuous in the signal, and hence
there exists x′′1 < x
′
1 such that action 1 is the strict best response in round 1 against
s at all signals x1 ≥ x′′1. Hence action 1 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1
for all x1 ≥ x′′1. Iterating this argument, action 1 is the unique rationalizable action in
round 1 at all x1 such that mdyn(x1) > 0. Symmetric argument establishes that action
0 is the unique rationalizable action in round 1 at all x1 such that mdyn(x1) < 0.
We have established that each serially undominated strategy s = (s1, s2) prescribes
to play according to the threshold strategy s1 with the threshold x
∗∗
1 in round 1.
Then s2 must be the unique serially undominated in the continuation game Γ2(x
∗∗
1 )
by Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 6. Before proceeding with the proof, let us introduce some addi-
tional notation. Let F˜ (z1, z2) = Pr(η
i
1 ≥ z1 ∧ ηi2 ≥ z2) denote the complementary
cumulative distribution function of (ηi1, η
i
2). If η
i
2 and η
i
∆ are independent, the set H
is a parallelogram and η∆ = −η∆ = h1 − h2. Further note that, as xi2 is sufficient
statistic, player i’s decision in round 2 depends only on xi2 and not on x
i
1. Thus,
s2(x
i
2) is a monotone function R → {0, 1} with a threshold denoted by x∗2. Let us
also denote η∗ = x
∗
2−x1
σ
.
15Upper dominance region is implied by A3a and lower dominance region by A3a and A3b.
41
Let us divide the proof into three cases depending on the value of x1.
Case (a). If u2(x1, 0, 0) > 0, then u2(x1 − σh1, 0, 0) > 0 for σ that is small
enough. Then, all types with xi1 ≥ x1 strictly prefer to stay in the project in the
continuation game Γ2(x1, σ). Then, `1(θ) = `2(θ) and so mdyn(x1, σ) = mst(x1, σ)
and limσ→0+ mdyn(x1, σ) = m∗st(x1) =
∫ 1
0
(
u1(x1, l, l) + u2(x1, l, l)
)
dl.
Case (b). Consider the case when
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 < 0. We show that then
limσ→0+ mdyn(x1, σ) =
∫ 1
0
u1(x1, l1, 0)dl1. First, the inequality
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 < 0
implies that x∗2(σ) ≥ x1+σ(h1+h2) when σ is sufficiently small. Suppose the opposite
inequality x∗2(σ) < x1 + σ(h1 + h2) holds. Then, for type x who observes signal x
∗
2 in
round 2 we obtain
U2(x) <
∫ 1
0
u2(x1 + σ(h1 + 2h2), 1, l2)dl2, (16)
The above inequality is based on three observations. First, a player with signal x∗2
in round 2 knows with certainty that the fundamental does not exceed the value
x∗2 + σh2 < x1 + σ(h1 + h2) + σh2 = x1 + σ(h1 + 2h2). Second, the investment level
l1 can be at most 1. Third, the second round belief of the player who observes x
∗
2
about l2 is stochastically dominated by the uniform distribution on [0, 1], as only
fellow players who observe second round signal xi2 ≥ x∗2 can possibly participate in
the second stage.
The right-hand side of (16) is negative for sufficiently small σ, which establishes
a contradiction because the type x (with signal x∗2 in round 2) weakly prefers to
stay in the project. Thus, indeed x∗2(σ) ≥ x1 + σ(h1 + h2). This inequality implies
that the types with xi1 = x1 do not reach action history 11 in Γ2(x1, σ), and hence
D2(x1, σ) = 0. Moreover, ϑ1(l1;x1, σ) ≤ x1 + σh1 for all l1 ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
λ2(l1) ≤ `2(x1 + σh1). But `2(x1 + σh1) = 0 because we established that players with
the second signal at most x1 + σ(h1 + h2) do not invest in the continuation game
Γ2(x1, σ). Thus, λ2(l1) = 0 for all l1 ∈ (0, 1) and for sufficiently small σ.
Case (c). Consider the case when u2(x1, 0, 0) ≤ 0 ≤
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2. This
case requires some additional notation. Let a1 =
x1−θ
σ
, a2 =
x∗2−θ
σ
= a1 + η
∗. Note
that `1(x1 − σa1) depends only on a1 and is independent of x1, x∗2 and σ. Similarly
`2(x1 − σa1) depends only on a1 and η∗. To see this, recall that `1(θ) = Pr(xi1 ≥
x1 | θ) = Pr
(
ηi1 ≥ x1−θσ | θ
)
, and thus, `1(x1 − σa1) = Pr(ηi1 ≥ a1) = F˜ (a1,−h2).
Similarly, `2(x1 − σa1) = Pr(ηi1 ≥ a1 ∧ ηi2 ≥ a1 + η∗) = F˜ (a1, a1 + η∗).
Player receiving the threshold signal x∗2 in round 2 must be indifferent between
actions 0 and 1 in the continuation game Γ2(x1, σ). In the above notation, and after
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transformation θ = x1 − σ(a2 − η∗), the indifference condition can be written as
J(η, σ) =
∫ h2
−h2
u2
(
x1− σ(a2− η), F˜ (a2− η,−h2), F˜ (a2− η, a2)
)
g2(a2) da2 = 0. (17)
Observe that for σ > 0: J(η, σ) is strictly increasing and continuous in η and due
to the existence of dominance regions, it attains both positive and negative values.
Thus, for every σ > 0 there exists unique η = η∗(σ) such that J(η, σ) = 0. For σ = 0:
J(η, 0) is strictly increasing in η as well, by strict monotonicity of u2 in l2. Therefore,
the equation J(η, 0) = 0 has at most one solution.
Now, for η = −(h1 + h2) and for all a2 ≥ −h2, we have F˜ (a2 − η,−h2) = F˜ (a2 −
η, a2) = 0. Moreover, for η = h1 + h2 and a2 ≤ h2, we have F˜ (a2 − η,−h2) = 1 and
F˜ (a2 − η, a2) = Pr(ηi2 ≥ a2) = 1 − F2(a2), where F2 is the cumulative distribution
function of ηi2. Summing up,
J
(− (h1 + h2), 0) = u2(x1, 0, 0) ≤ 0 ≤ ∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 = J(h1 + h2, 0).
Therefore, the equation J(η, 0) = 0 indeed has a unique solution and that solution
lies in the interval [−(h1 + h2), h1 + h2]; denote it η∗∗. It follows that η∗(σ) → η∗∗
as σ → 0+ and η∗∗ is continuous and decreasing in x1, for x1 satisfying u2(x1, 0, 0) ≤
0 ≤ ∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2.
Let us now study limσ→0+ Dt(x1, σ), t = 1, 2, for the range of x1 considered in (c).
In order to study the limit limσ→0+ D1(x1, σ), let us first denote F˜
−1
1 (l) the inverse
function to F˜ (z,−h2) with respect to z. Then, ϑ1(l1) = x1 − σF˜−11 (l1) and λ2(l1) =
F˜
(
F˜−11 (l1), F˜
−1
1 (l1) + η
∗(σ)
)
. Both are continuous in x1 and σ, and in the limit
σ → 0+, we have ϑ1(l1)→ x1 and λ2(l1)→ λ∗2(l1;x1) = F˜
(
F˜−11 (l1), F˜
−1
1 (l1)+η
∗∗(x1)
)
.
Note that the latter is non-increasing in η∗∗. Thus, the limit
lim
σ→0+
D1(x1, σ) = lim
σ→0+
∫ 1
0
u1(x1 − σF˜−11 (l1), l1, λ2(l1))dl1 =
∫ 1
0
u1(x1, l1, λ
∗
2(l1;x1))dl1
exists, is continuous in x1, and strictly increasing in x1. The monotonicity is strict
by the assumption of the strict state monotonicity A1.
Similarly, if we denote F˜−12 (l, η) the inverse function to F˜ (z, z+η) with respect to
z, we obtain ϑ2(l2) = x1 − σF˜−12 (l2, η) and λ1(l2) = F˜
(
F˜−12 (l2, η
∗(σ)), −h2
)
. Again,
both are continuous in x1 and σ and in the limit σ → 0+ we obtain ϑ2(l2)→ x1 and
λ1(l2) = F˜
(
F˜−12 (l2, η
∗∗), −h2
)
for x1 considered in the case (c). Therefore also the
limit D∗2(x1) = limσ→0+ D2(x1, σ) exists, and it is continuous in x1. Moreover D
∗
2(x1)
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is non-decreasing because we established in the Proof of Lemma 4 that D2(x1, σ)
increases in x1 for each σ. Therefore the sum m
∗
dyn(x1) = D
∗
1(x1) + D
∗
2(x1) exists, is
continuous in x1, and is strictly increasing in x1 for x1 in the range considered in case
(c).
We found that the limit m∗dyn(x1) is continuous in x1 for ranges of x1 considered
in all the three cases (a), (b), and (c). Moreover, in case (c), η∗∗ = −(h1 + h2)
if u2(x1, 0, 0) = 0 and η
∗∗ = h1 + h2 if
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 = 0, which implies that
m∗dyn(x1) continuously connects at the boundaries in between the cases (a) and (c),
and in between cases (c) and (b).
Proof of Proposition 5. Ifm∗dyn(θ
∗) > 0 thenm∗dyn(θ) is positive on some δ-neighborhood
of θ∗. Together with the monotonicity of mdyn(θ, σ) with respect to θ it implies that
mdyn(θ, σ) is positive in the δ-neighborhood of θ
∗ for σ < σ, for some σ > 0. For
sufficiently small σ all players receive signals xi1 above θ
∗ − δ in round 1 of Γdyn(σ)
whenever Nature draws fundamental θ∗ and σ < σ. Then, by Proposition 2, action 1
is the unique rationalizable action for all players in round 1 of Γdyn(σ). The symmetric
argument implies that if m∗dyn(θ
∗) < 0 then action 0 is selected.
Function m∗dyn(θ) has a unique root at which none of the actions is selected in
round 1 of Γdyn. Hence the reverse implications hold as well.
Let us introduce and remind notation used in the proofs that follow. Let x2(x1;σ) =
x1 + σ(h1 + h2); If player receives x2(x1;σ) in round 2, then she knows that all the
fellow players have received signals at least x1 in round 1. Let L2(x1;σ) be the set
of types who reach action history 11 if they play rationalizable strategy in the con-
tinuation game Γ2(x1;σ); let x(η;σ) be the intersection of ∂L2(x1;σ) with the line
x2 − x1 = η, where η ∈ [η∆, η∆]. Let x2(η;σ) be the second coordinate of x(η;σ).
We will pay attention to the round 2 signal x2(η∆;σ) which has the following prop-
erty implied by monotonicity of s2: all types (x
′
1, x2) ∈ X such that x′1 ≥ x1 and
x2 > x2(η∆;σ) reach action history 11 in Γ2(x1;σ).
Lemma 7. If
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 > 0, then there exists σ > 0 such that x2(η∆;σ) <
x2(x1;σ) for all σ < σ (the notation is introduced in the paragraph above).
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a sequence σk → 0+ such
that x2(η∆;σk) ≥ x2(x1;σk) for all k.
Let us explore beliefs of the type x(η∆;σk). First, she knows that θ ≥ x1 − σkh1.
Second, she knows that l1 = 1 because only fellow players’ signals at least x1 are
compatible with her second signal which is x2(x1;σk) or larger. Third, her belief about
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l2 stochastically dominates uniform distribution on [0, 1]. This is because all players
with xi2 > x2(η∆;σk) invest in both rounds and a player receiving x
i
2 = x2(η∆;σk) has
uniform belief about the proportion of players with the second signal above x2(η∆;σk).
Using all the three observations we get
U2 (x(η∆;σk)) ≥
∫ 1
0
u2(x1 − σkh1, 1, l2)dl2. (18)
The right-hand side of (18) is positive for sufficiently small σk because
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2
is continuous in x1.
This contradicts the indifference condition U2 (x(η∆;σk)) = 0. The indifference
condition must hold because the type x(η∆;σk) is in the interior of L1(x1) by the
assumption that x2(η∆;σk) ≥ x2(x1;σk).
Proof of Proposition 6. Claim (i) Let x∗2(σ) be the minimal second round signal at
which a player can reach action history 11 under the (essentially) unique rationalizable
strategy (s1, s2) in Γdyn(σ):
x∗2(σ) = min{x2 : ∃x1 s.t. (x1, x2) ∈ X, and s1(x1, x2) = s2(x1, x2) = 1}.
(The minimum is attained by our convention that L1 and L2 are closed sets.)
Suppose claim (i) does not hold. Then there exists a sequence σk → 0+, such that
x∗2(σk) ≤ θ∗ + σkh2 so that some players choose action 1 in the both rounds when
Nature draws θ∗. Let us examine payoff expectation of the type receiving the signal
x∗2(σk) in round 2. In particular, let (x1, x
∗
2(σk)) ∈ X be a type that reaches action
history 11. The following inequality holds:
U2(x1, x
∗
2(σk);σk) ≤
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗ + 2σkh2, 1, l2)dl2. (19)
This holds by the following three arguments: First, a player with round 2 signal x∗2(σk)
knows that the fundamental lies below x∗2(σk)+σkh2 ≤ θ∗+2σkh2. Second, investment
level l1 cannot exceed one. Third, only types with x
i
2 ≥ x∗2(σk) can possibly invest in
both rounds, and the type with the second signal equal to x∗2(σk) has uniform belief
about proportion of players with the second signal at least x∗2(σk).
The right-hand side of (19) is negative for sufficiently small σ because
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗, 1, l2)dl2 <
0 and
∫ 1
0
u2(θ, 1, l2)dl2 is continuous in θ. This contradicts the assumption that the
type (x1, x
∗
2(σk)) prefers to invest in round 2.
Claim (ii) (See page 44 for notation.) If action 1 is selected at θ∗ in Γdyn then
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m∗dyn(θ
∗) > 0 by Proposition 5 and, because m∗dyn is continuous, m
∗
dyn(θ
∗ − δ) > 0 for
some δ > 0. Again by Proposition 5, action 1 is selected at θ∗− δ in round 1 of Γdyn.
Therefore, for σ < σ players invest in round 1 of Γdyn(σ) for all signals x
i
1 ≥ θ∗−δ, and
we can apply Lemma 7: choosing δ > 0 small enough so that
∫ 1
0
u2(θ
∗ − δ, 1, l2) > 0,
we have s2 (θ
∗ − δ, x2(θ∗ − δ, σ)) = 1 in the unique equilibrium of Γdyn(σ).
If Nature draws fundamental θ∗ then types of all players exceed (θ∗−σh1, θ∗−σh2).
We can choose σ′ small enough so that for σ < σ′, (θ∗ − σh1, θ∗ − σh2) > (θ∗ −
δ, x2(θ
∗ − δ, σ)) and so that all players invest in the both rounds whenever Nature
draws fundamental θ∗.
Supplement to Proof of Proposition 8. If
∫ 1
0
u2(x1, 1, l2)dl2 > 0 and payoffs do not
exhibit forward spillovers then
m∗dyn(x1) ≤ m∗st(x1) (20)
by the following argument: By Lemma 7 players reach action history 11 in Γ2(x1, σ)
whenever their round 2 signal exceeds x2(x1, σ). Hence if Nature draws θ > x2(x1, σ)+
σh2 = x1 + σ(h1 + 2h2) all players reach action history 11 in the continuation game
Γ2(x1, σ). Then ϑ2(l2, x1, σ) ≤ x1 +σ(h1 + 2h2) for all l2 ∈ (0, 1) where ϑ2(l2, x1, σ) is
the inverse function to the stage 2 investment profile `2(θ) induced by the rationaliz-
able strategy in the continuation game of Γ2(x1, σ). Therefore we have∫ 1
0
u2(ϑ2(l2, x1, σ), l2)dl2 ≤
∫ 1
0
u2(x1 + σ(h1 + 2h2), l2)dl2 ≤
≤
∫ 1
0
u2(ϑ1(l2, x1 + 2σ(h1 + h2), σ), l2)dl2.
In the first inequality, we used x1 − σh1 ≤ ϑ1(l, x1, σ) for all l ∈ (0, 1). We also have
(trivially)∫ 1
0
u1(ϑ1(l1, x1, σ), l1, λ2(l1))dl1 ≤
∫ 1
0
u1(ϑ1(l1, x1, σ), l1, l1)dl1 ≤
≤
∫ 1
0
u1(ϑ1(l1, x1 + 2σ(h1 + h2), σ), l1, l1)dl1.
Summing the two inequalities we get mdyn(x1, σ) ≤ mst(x1 + 2σ(h1 + h2), σ) and, as
σ → 0, the inequality (20).
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